


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19 November 1985



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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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19 November 1985

**USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS**

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COL GEN UTKIN: POLITICAL WORK MUST AFFECT ALL MILITARY AREAS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 85 pp 8-14

[Article by Col Gen Utkin under the rubric "Toward the 27th CPSU Congress: Ideological Indoctrination is an Extremely Important Area of Party Work"]

[Text] During preparations for the 27th Congress of the Lenin party, the Soviet people and fightingmen of the army and navy are doing their utmost on the job, exactingly assessing what has been accomplished and comparing the results of their work with the urgent demands of the times. The main directions, the spirit and style of all the pre-congress work were precisely defined in resolutions coming out of the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum of the party's Central Committee directed the special attention of the communists to the need to enhance the effectiveness of the ideological and indoctrinational work, to link it with life in the closest possible manner, to speak with the people in the language of truth. "Wise party words spoken to the individual," the plenum stated, "provokes thinking and develops initiative in the people and instills intolerance of shortcomings."

Ideological and indoctrinational work is one of the basic aspects of party work. The accomplishment of national economic plans, our rates of advance and the strengthening of the nation's defense capability depend in great part upon how well it is able to mobilize the spiritual energy of the people, to rouse them for labor and social activeness.

We say with complete justification that there is not a single area of life of the Soviet Armed Forces, not a single aspect of troop training which is not within the sphere of ideological, political and indoctrinational work. It introduces into the work of the military cadres a spirit of thorough understanding of the tasks facing them, the ability to understand the political significance of the military work, and motivates them to make an absolutely all-out effort to develop aware, courageous and skilled defenders of the homeland. The ideological work produces particularly perceptible results when it is solidly linked with active organizational work, when words and deeds are indivisible, and formalism, idle talk and overemphasis on written reports are reliably eliminated.

Ideological indoctrination of the communists and of all the fightingmen is the main area of work for the party organizations. It is the force of ideological influence upon all aspects of the servicemen's life which helps to develop a good, militant attitude in the personnel, a climate of smoothly coordinated and effective military work, to shape healthy relations, good organization and discipline in the troop milieu. When we speak of the party organization as a center of daily ideological and indoctrinational work, we therefore include in the concept the ability of the party collective as a whole and of each communist individually to unite the fightingmen, to motivate them spiritually to achieve new successes in the mastery of the combat equipment and weapons, in the strengthening of discipline and organization, and to prompt them to strive with a sense of profound awareness to enhance the combat readiness of their subunit and their unit.

Fightingmen of the unit in which Lieutenant Colonel A. Shlyakhtenko heads the party organization stand out for their excellent training. The communists there exert an extremely perceptible influence upon the combat and political training of the personnel. It begins with the thoroughly planned distribution of party forces and with the assignment of precisely defined tasks for each party member with respect to exerting a continuous ideological influence upon the personnel. The fulfillment of decisions is monitored on a daily basis, and every communist is held strictly accountable for the activeness of his position in life and his intolerance of shortcomings. Not long ago, the tankmen participated in a tactical exercise. It was held in an unfamiliar area, in difficult conditions. The party organization did a great deal to assist the commander in mobilizing the personnel to perform successfully in the field. The communists were in the areas of greatest responsibility, leading all of the fightingmen with their words and their personal example. They took advantage of every opportunity to talk with the men, to put each of them into a militant mood, to inspire them to perform the assigned mission with excellence. The aktiv was thoroughly briefed and distributed in advance so that not a single soldier remained outside the sphere of ideological influence, and for that purpose the energy and initiative of the communists was supplemented with coordinated work by the agitators, Komsomol group organizers and editors of operational news sheets. The well conceived party and political work in all phases of the exercise helped the unit to earn a good rating.

Exercises provide a certain summarization of the military training of the fightingmen and also provide an evaluation of the level of the political and indoctrinational work aimed at maintaining the personnel in a constant state of combat readiness. And in order for reality to give it a high rating, daily, painstaking efforts are needed on the part of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists, propagandists and agitators, and efforts aimed at shaping an aware attitude toward the service, the essential moral qualities and fighting efficiency, a desire to be outstanding in the training and a master of military affairs in every soldier and sergeant, warrant officer and officer. The party committee headed by Shlyakhtenko strictly sees to it that none of the communists evades participating in the indoctrinational process, that political training is conducted regularly and with proper effectiveness for all categories of servicemen and that talks and seminars, the work of the

agitation and propaganda groups and lecture groups, the libraries and clubs produces real benefit. Every communist responsible for a specific area of ideological indoctrination of the fightingmen is constantly aware of the party committee's concern and support and knows that at a difficult time he will always be helped and advised as to how best to organize the job and when necessary, will be held strictly accountable for laziness, inaction and complacency.

In order for the party organization to truly carry out its role as a center of ideological and indoctrinational work, it is essential for the political active-ness of every communist to steadily increase, for him to become an ideological fighter in deeds and not just in words, for him to consider it his most important duty to take part in the spiritual indoctrination of the fightingmen. In order to achieve this, it is important for the party committees and bureaus not to ignore for a single day questions pertaining to the ideological strengthening of party members and candidate members, to provide them with advanced know-how, to teach them in a focused manner and hold them strictly accountable for their ideological growth, for specific participation in the political and indoctrinational work and for its results. Paramount importance should be attached to the vital stance of the communist, to his zeal, initiative and creativity in the fulfillment of his service duties and to his irreproachable adherence to our moral standards. This is the foundation, if you like, of the communist's development as an indoctrinator, as an agent of the party's ideological influence upon the personnel. "A person is judged," V.I. Lenin wrote, "not by what he says or thinks of himself but by his deeds." A communist can be the finest expert on methods and indoctrination, but if he is not strictly demanding of himself and does not set an example in the service and in his personal life, the effect of his indoctrinational work will be nil, because his words and his deeds are not one and the same.

Unfortunately, this still occurs. The communists in one of the units brought Officer O. Rodionov, a CPSU member, to account on the basis of principle for shortcomings in the service, lack of tact in dealing with people and slovenli-ness in his personal life. And his position called for him not just to train, but to indoctrinate subordinates, to expect them to strictly observe military discipline, moral and ethical standards. It is clear that all of his appeals had no effect. People do not forgive indoctrinators for duplicity, arrogance or divergence of words and deeds. This statement was made at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "We must increase our demandingness of every party member for his attitude toward his public duty, for the fulfillment of party decisions, for maintaining the honorable and pure image of a party member. The communist is evaluated on the basis of his actions and deeds. There are no other criteria, nor can there be."

Since the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which indicated specific ways to enhance the effectiveness of the party's ideological and indoctrinational work, including indoctrination of the communists, a great deal has been done to improve the Marxist-Leninist preparation of the cadres, to improve the system of party education and to give workers on the ideological front and non-staff propagandists the methodological skills essential for them to exert a party influence upon the men more successfully. This applies primarily to the basic forms of political training, in which most of the communists are engaged.

Many party committees and bureaus have become more deeply involved in the process of Marxist-Lenist training for the officers, providing them with more assistance in their independent work and being more demanding of the quality of lectures and seminars.

Concern for the ideological, theoretical and methodological training of the communists in charge of various forms of political training for the personnel, particularly those in charge of political training groups for soldiers and sergeants is helping to raise the level of indoctrination for the fightingmen. It would be appropriate to make special mention of the fact that today, when extensive preparations are underway for the 27th CPSU Congress, it is important to do everything possible to increase the ideological content of the political classes, to see that they include the skillful publicizing of the historical achievements and advantages of socialism and the successes achieved by the Soviet people in the building of communism, and the substantiated exposure of imperialism's aggressive nature. This requires improving all aspects of the training for group leaders and making increased demands of each of them for the ideological-theoretical and methodological level of the classes. We have the experience, and the task is one of carefully studying and disseminating it, of making it available to all the party collectives.

A great deal is done to help the non-staff propagandists in the unit in which Major V. Katkov is secretary of the party committee, for example. The party activists there work in close contact with the commander and strictly see to it that the established amount of time is made available on a mandatory basis for the group leaders to prepare well for the classes. A good methodological room has been set up. It has the necessary literature, visual aides and technical propaganda facilities. The party committee members consider it their duty to carefully monitor the group leaders to see how they are improving their skill and what kind of assistance they need, and offer them useful advice and recommendations. Open classes are regularly conducted, at which the young non-staff propagandists have the opportunity to enrich themselves with advanced know-how, to adopt everything which is most valuable in the arsenal of the best methods experts. The party committee regularly invites the communists in charge of groups to its meetings, hears reports from them on their ideological growth and holds them strictly accountable for the quality of their classes. The results of the past training year and the winter training period of this year showed the unit to be one of the best in the organization of the training process in general and the political training specifically.

The ideological indoctrination of people is a creative process, and party organizations have a broad field of action for involving all of the communists in it, for employing the most diverse forms and means of enhancing their spiritual influence upon the personnel. It is a matter of properly managing all of these means, of doing everything possible to see that they are used as effectively as possible and produce the maximum results. We still frequently encounter manifestations of formalism and overemphasis on written reports, attempts by certain party leaders to substitute reports on the number of lectures presented or the number of measures implemented for real results from the indoctrination.

When the party activists select specific forms of ideological and indoctrinal work, the specific people for whom they are intended are not always taken into account. The military collectives are not all of the same composition, after all. The fightingmen have different general education and technical training, different kinds of experience in life, different habits and national characteristics. A certain selectiveness is required for dealing with officers and warrant officers, with officers in their second year of service and with the new soldiers, with the personnel in an outstanding collective and those in a lagging one. Conducting the indoctrinal process in a creative manner involves primarily seeing beyond the broad concept "personnel" to the individual with its complex spiritual world and its own peculiarities.

It is extremely important to move qualitative and not quantitative indicators to the forefront, not to limit lectures, reports and talks to the repetition of well-known facts but to attempt to speak confidentially and frankly with the men, to provide new information in a presentation and link it closely with the specific affairs of the subunit and unit. This work does not produce proper results when attention is not given to this, when the work is performed in the old way. Take the collective in which Major N. Fidash, a communist, serves. At first glance it would appear that various indoctrinal measures are carried out there. They lack system, however, precise orientation toward a specific audience and an effort to get through to every fightingman. When they address the soldiers, certain communists think not so much about influencing their minds and feelings as about "covering what is supposed to be covered" as rapidly as possible.

One would think that the unit party organization would have been expected to overcome the deficiencies in the ideological indoctrination of the men and in the work of the communists in that collective. The party committee essentially remained on the sideline in this important matter, however, assuming from habit that this was the job of the propagandists. The activists did not bother to study the substance or the qualitative level of the political and indoctrinal measures carried out by the communists, did not exhibit any concern about their low level, their lack of linkage with life or their formalism. This is what caused the situation in which hitches developed in the indoctrinal work, left to proceed on its own, in which it was performed passively.

Deficiencies of this kind are another reminder of how important it is to constantly concern ourselves with enhancing the effectiveness of the ideological and indoctrinal work performed by party organizations, to take all possible steps to see that the company, battery or equivalent subunit truly becomes a real center of political and indoctrinal activity. This is not an easy task, of course. After all, there are relatively few communists in a subunit as a rule. The fightingmen live, work and improve their combat readiness right in the company or battery, however, and this is where all of their joys and disappointments, their thoughts and aspirations are clearly visible. And for this reason, this is where the best opportunities exist for getting through to every specific individual in the indoctrinal work, influencing his mind from the party standpoint, inspiring him to serve successfully.

The excellent company commanded by Guards Captain A. Kozin has been known for its excellent work for more than a single year now. It has only a few communists, but this is a harmonious, closely united party collective. Each of the party members sets a fitting example in all respects. They do not consider the time spent, but take an active part in the indoctrination of the fighting-men, in their political information, in group and individual talks and in organizing meaningful leisure time activities for the personnel. These have room for interesting evening discussions on the subject "At the Map of the Homeland," for amateur art classes and sports competitions. The company communists do not wait for special instructions for conducting the specific measures but attempt to take advantage of any opportunity to conduct frank talks with the soldiers, to answer their questions, to motivate them for excellent training and service. And it is no accident that there have been no significant disciplinary infractions in the company for a long time now, that a spiritual microclimate conducive to the performance of the service duties has been created there and that the company is firmly in first place in the precongress socialist competition.

In short, experience has demonstrated that every subunit and every party organization provides all possibilities for the communists to exert the necessary ideological influence upon the personnel, for uniting them to successfully accomplish the missions facing them. It is only necessary to organize this work on a well conceived basis, to find and activate existing reserves.

In order to enhance the effectiveness of the ideological indoctrination of the fightingmen in the company and equivalent subunits, it is urgently necessary for all communists at the supervisory level constantly to take part in this important work. Lenin's demand that party leaders "live in the thick of the working life and know it inside out" is still valid today. Daily political work in the masses must become an inner need for the communist-and-leader, the determining element in his workstyle. Furthermore, not a single communist-and-leader, no matter what position he occupies, should remain outside the sphere of party influence. Where this occurs, not only does the ideological work suffer, but the basis is sometimes created for abuse of service position, for suppressing criticism and for the weakening of ties with the masses, and serious deficiencies ultimately develop in the training and indoctrinational process.

In order for the party organizations always to be up to their tasks and tirelessly to exert an ideological influence upon the personnel, it is highly important for their work to be supervised on a daily basis by the political organ. Experience has shown that the greatest success is achieved by those political organs which thoroughly and objectively assess the state of the ideological and indoctrinational work performed by the party organizations, which can see in it not just the requirements of the present, but also the long range, which earnestly concern themselves with the theoretical and methodological training of the propaganda cadres and resolutely combat formalism, rubber-stamping and conventionalism. A great deal depends upon the professional competence of the chief of the political organ, upon the political caliber of his thinking, which must permit him to independently analyze the processes occurring in actual life, assess them from a class and political

standpoint and derive the necessary conclusions for the practical work. This makes it possible, in the words of V.I. Lenin, to influence the people and those in charge of the party organizations "not with the force of power, but with the force of authority, the force of vigor, greater experience, greater versatility and greater talent."

Guards Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Kulibaba, a political section chief, for example, possesses these qualities. He heads an officers' Marxist-Leninist training group and an agitation and propaganda collective. He regularly presents lectures and reports to the personnel and demonstrates great concern for enhancing the effectiveness and the ideological content of all political and indoctrinal activities conducted in the units. With his active participation in the ideological and political indoctrination of the servicemen, the political section chief develops the same sort of earnest, creative attitude toward the ideological work in the officers in the political organ, as well as the commanders, political workers and nonstaff propagandists. He teaches them how to make skillful use of the entire extensive arsenal for exerting ideological and moral influence upon the personnel and shows them what it means to overcome formalism and mechanical actions in the indoctrinal work, to take the increased spiritual needs of the fightingmen into full account, not in words but with deeds.

In its supervision of the work of party organizations the political organ devotes its main attention to the training and indoctrination of secretaries of party committees and bureaus and the aktiv, to organizing and analyzing the ideological and indoctrinal work. Yuriy Nikolayevich Kulibaba's reports at party meetings, his personal communication with the communists and his talks with them on enhancing the effectiveness of political and indoctrinal work in the subunits are highly effective.

Monitoring and verification of execution is an important component of the political organ's workstyle for supervising the ideological and indoctrinal process. They constitute an important means of combatting complacency and pretentiousness in the party work, help to increase the responsibility and discipline of the communists and prevent possible blunders. Inspections of the work of certain party organizations in the ideological indoctrination of the fightingmen have shown that they have still not eliminated elements of formalism in this extremely important matter and are doing little to see that all of the communists engage actively in the ideological indoctrination. Urgent questions of ideological and indoctrinal work are not always discussed with proper urgency or principle at party meetings. This is especially true of the staff party organizations. They do not always exert the necessary influence when it comes to the performance of indoctrinal tasks and do not truly concern themselves with increasing the responsibility of each communist for the assigned job, for the indoctrination of subordinates.

The workstyle of the political organs themselves sometimes leaves something to be desired. They sometimes register only that which "lies on the surface," without getting thoroughly into the life of the party organizations and without studying the processes occurring in the military collectives. Inspections of the work of party organizations are sometimes limited to the same old questions, not always the most significant, while truly important questions are

not covered. In some places the workers in the political organs are bound by obsolete concepts and are unable to grasp new and progressive things and spread them extensively. Furthermore, they do not always have the party qualities necessary to assess the work performed in the units self-critically, to see the errors and weak spots in it, to draw the necessary conclusions for the future.

In view of the increased military danger brought about by imperialism's reactionary circles led by the USA, the task of enhancing our homeland's defense capability is especially urgent today. Washington has not given up on its attempts to achieve a dominant position in the world, particularly in the military respect, and continues to be the initiator of the arms race and of material preparations for a nuclear missile war. This is why it is particularly urgent to enhance the vigilance and combat readiness of the subunits and units. The effective way to accomplish this is to increase the political awareness of the servicemen, to develop in each of them a great sense of personal responsibility for maintaining firm military order.

Report-and-election campaigns will begin soon in the party organizations. As they prepare for this important precongress inspection, the political organs and party organizations are persistently directing their efforts toward the fulfillment of the party's instructions for enhancing the effectiveness of the ideological, political and indoctrinational work. They are revealing unutilized reserves, developing criticism of shortcomings based on principle and persistently seeking ways to correct them. The communists are well aware that their daily, unweakened concern for the ideological indoctrination of the personnel is serving the noble cause of developing morally strong, steadfast and aware defenders of the homeland and helping to enhance the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

KOMSOMOL, STAFFS NEGLECT WORK WITH YOUNG, REGULAR OFFICERS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 12, Jun 85 (Signed to press 4 Jun 85) pp 68-72

[Article by Capt Yu. Tretyakov under the rubric "Komsomol Life": "The Effect of Influence: Comments on the Work Performed by the Komsomol Committee with Young Officers"]

[Text] Captain V. Korniyevets, the company commander, was firm:

"That's it. It's time to make him answer to the Komsomol."

They were talking about Lieutenant S. Kosarev, a platoon commander. The company commander was discussing him with the secretary of the Komsomol committee.

This is what led up to it. The young officer joined the company. And as is frequently the case at first, it was immediately sensed that he lacked both solid practical knowledge and experience in working with people. Kosarev was not held to blame for a time, however. The recent school graduate does not shape up immediately, after all. This requires time, help from his superiors, sensitivity and concern on their part. All of this, multiplied by the young officer's desire to acquire the solid stamp of a commander as rapidly as possible, bears fruit sooner or later.

Kosarev had the desire. At times there was something else, however: attempts to attribute all of the errors which are inevitable in the beginning to his youth, to attribute his deficiencies to lack of experience alone, his poor preparation for the classes entirely to factors beyond his control. Captain V. Korniyevets, company commander, attempted to talk frankly with his subordinate, but they did not come to a mutual understanding. Kosarev was offended. He withdrew even further into himself, completely stopped sharing his feelings with his colleagues and began perceiving justified criticism of himself as petty nagging. The conflict dragged out, so to speak. And only after this had become obvious did people in the unit become seriously concerned.

The unit commander, his deputy for political affairs, members of the party committee and other senior comrades turned their attention to the young officer. They took a special approach and exercised special tact with Lieutenant Kosarev, precisely measuring out benevolence and demandingness--in short, everything which

ultimately helped to bring out his best qualities. It still has to be admitted, however, that had his senior comrades learned of the conflict as it was developing, had they gotten to the bottom of the matter immediately, the young officer's first steps would unquestionably have been more confident.

I believe that the Komsomol committee could also have played a significant role in the matter. Who, after all, if not its members, should constantly inquire about the affairs of the recent graduates? Who, if not they, are closer to the needs, problems and difficulties of the latter, who better understands the fine shades of the mental state, the subtleties of the spiritual experience of the first difficult months in the officer's development. All the more because almost half of the Komsomol committee is made up of young officers who themselves quite recently experienced the same difficulties and the same worries. Neither the Komsomol secretary--who, incidentally, was one of the first to be informed of the captain's troubles by Korniyevets--nor the members of the Komsomol committee inquired about Lieutenant Kosarev's development or considered it necessary to get to the bottom of the developing conflict. Strange as it sounds, they decided that this was not within their sphere of action.

Yes, this position, a position of noninterference on the part of certain Komsomol committees into the affairs of recent military school graduates, sometimes makes itself known. But how important and how necessary it is to look into their concerns and problems. It is no secret, after all, that the development of some of the young officers is somewhat prolonged. Certain officers/ Komsomol members, it was pointed out at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations, are naive in assessing developments and facts of modern life, are passive with respect to their military service and sometimes permit moral breakdowns to occur. It is the concern of the Komsomol organizations to notice this, to know why it is occurring and to help the lieutenants get off on the right foot in the service. They could do a great deal toward developing in the young officers an inclination and a desire to get close to their subordinates, the ability to become a part of the collective, to establish correct relations among the men. In short, is this not the great purpose of the Komsomol work--to help the young officers acquire confidence and develop an active stance in life? This is one of those questions, I believe, which can have only one answer: Yes, it is. However....

In talking with the Komsomol activists, one hears it said that it is the concern exclusively of commanders, political workers and the party committee to work with the young officers. How does one account for such a one-sided viewpoint? One hears the most diverse answers to this question. Some say that most of the members of the Komsomol committee are young and that it is simply too much for them to carry out such a difficult task, that they lack both the experience and the knowledge. It is also said that they simply do not get around to it because they have so many more urgent matters to deal with. One also hears the following argument: The officer is himself the indoctrinator of his subordinates, so is there any point in indoctrinating him too? In short, this clearly erroneous position has been explained in various ways. It essentially amounts to one thing, however: the inability and sometimes, a lack of desire to take on such a truly difficult and urgent problem.

And so, the Komsomol committee and the young officer.... What are the boundaries of their mutual relations? How can the lieutenant be helped to develop as a commander, as an indoctrinator?

These questions are among the most important for Lieutenant V. Yakushev, secretary of the unit Komsomol committee? This is because there are many young officers in the regiment. And each of them has his own difficulties. His own problems. How does the Komsomol organization help to resolve them? They have a certain amount of experience. For example, it was the committee's initiative, supported by the commander, to invite the young officers to attend several classes conducted by the best unit specialists. Some people had their doubts in the beginning, to be sure. We have a commander training system, they said, and classes on instructional methods. Will be not be duplicating them? No, the classes proved to be not a duplication but a supplement to those. They taught the lieutenants what they had not completely understood or grasped previously.

The step was taken. It was a good one. Each of the young officers derived something new and interesting for himself. And what about the Komsomol committee members? They went even further. They went to the commander again with the idea of inviting the best specialists in the unit to attend classes conducted by the young officers. Let them study the performance of the latter, they said, and give advice and suggestions.

The classes brought out the fact that many of the young officers can learn from one another. They can learn methods for teaching firing rules to subordinates from Senior Lieutenant S. Maslovskiy, let us say, and methods for working on the equipment from Lieutenant E. Krasov. Their experience has been rigorously tested and is being successfully employed by other young officers, who contribute new elements of their own to it. This atmosphere, one in which the lieutenants are interested in one another's affairs and which the Komsomol committee tries to maintain, is one of the conditions for the professional growth of the young officers.

Something else is also important--prompt support for and the objective assessment of what has been achieved, a word of gratitude expressed at the right time and recognition of success. In the beginning it is particularly important for the lieutenant to know that his work is noticed and appreciated. This gives him confidence in his own abilities and makes him want to perform better.

...Lieutenant V. Kolgyashkin heard many good things about himself that day. He was awarded the Order of the Red Star for the exemplary performance of his international duty in Afghanistan. An hour later his comrades gathered at the club, congratulated him and sincerely wished him new successes in the service. The names of Lt. V. Yegorov and Senior Lieutenant S. Borisenko were mentioned at an evening gathering in honor of the officers. Incidentally, the Komsomol committee contributed much of interest to its organization. They did not soon forget the activity, of course. It was conceived not just for those who were being honored, however. As they drew attention to those out front and publicly noted their successes, the organizers of the gathering were providing a reference point, as it were, for the others.

In short, the undertaking was successful and beneficial. And it is not the only one the Komsomol has to its credit. I would like to say one thing at this point, however. No matter what kind of plans and projects pertaining directly to the problems of the young officers' professional development the Komsomol committee comes up with, it can hardly carry out the plans without the support of senior comrades. Their experience and knowledge are needed, as is precise information on where an officer has not been thorough, what he needs help with and precisely what kind of help. The Komsomol committee is always aware of this kind of support from the commander, the political worker and the party committee.

It would also be difficult to get by without the staff communists. Unfortunately, some of them feel that their main job is to monitor the training and the state of the equipment. Questions pertaining to the training and indoctrination of the lieutenants, they would say, are secondary. As veteran specialists, however, they could help the young officers a great deal at their jobs, give them competent advice and share their knowledge and skills with them. Without this, the range for influencing the recent school graduates is automatically narrowed.

Incidentally, the young officers' council set up in the unit also awaits more specific assistance from the staff communists. It has many interesting and useful undertakings to its credit. The council members frequently address the fightingmen and perform extensive military sponsorship work. And this work is unquestionably necessary and important. When we think about it, however, just what is the council's main purpose? It is perhaps to help the young officer avoid making mistakes in the beginning, to expand the sphere of his professional interests, to teach him how to correctly distribute his work time and a great many more things demanded of the lieutenant by the service. All the more since many of them need such assistance, including Lieutenants V. Senko, V. Kazantsev and V. Ulyanov.

How can the council improve its work? The members of the Komsomol committee need to think about this some more. One thing is certain, however: Excessive involvement in mass undertakings will not produce the desired effect. When we are dealing with the publicizing of advanced know-how and methodological skill, a concrete result can only be expected when the transfer of knowledge is effected man to man, so to speak. On an individual basis. And what kind of plans does the committee have? Unfortunately, not many at present. Questions pertaining to the professional growth of the young officers and their ideological conditioning have not been discussed at its meetings for a long time now, although there has been discussion of problems large and small--enhancing the combat readiness, strengthening discipline, uniting the collectives. Failing to consider the degree of participation in their resolution by the young officers is to knowingly reduce the effect of the planned activities.

Is this not the reason the young officers are still little involved in the work of the Komsomol organizations, even though many of them have been elected to company and battalion bureaus. Not all of the platoon commanders know how to rely upon the Komsomol organization in their daily work, how to make it their reliable assistant and ally. The young officers frequently limit themselves to a superficial review of the plans for the current month and brief advice on the operational news sheets the day before leaving for the field.

However, the Instructions to Komsomol Organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy contain the following: "Commanders... rely on the Komsomol organizations and direct their work...." And directing their work means being constantly informed about the affairs and concerns of the youth collective, being fully aware of the range of its interests and teaching the aktiv not in a random way but on a daily basis: planning, work forms and methods, and the art of selecting the most important of the diverse daily matters, selecting the main things on which the combat training and discipline depend at the given moment.

It means also taking a personal part in the meetings and in all the other activities conducted in the Komsomol organization. Taking part in them regardless of whether you are a member of the bureau. Participating in them is not a goal in itself but yet another opportunity to get to know one's subordinates better and gain a thorough understanding of their spiritual world, an opportunity to influence their personalities, their way of thinking and their feelings, gradually and purposefully, as well as tactfully and unobtrusively.

It must be admitted that the young officers do not always willingly take part in activities conducted on the company or battalion scale. Their reasoning is approximately the following: It is my job to conduct the class, to teach the soldiers their combat speciality, and the evenings of discussion on special subjects, talks and quizzes are all within the political worker's domain. This sort of "division" of labor can result in nothing but harm, because there is no definite and permanent dividing line between training and indoctrination, and there can be none.

The experience of Senior Lieutenant S. Derksen and Lieutenant Ye. Yegorov is proof of this. People in the companies cannot recall an activity which the officers did not attend. And they do more than just attend. They speak at the activities, offer a fresh idea. If necessary, they also help organize an exchange of know-how and conduct a technical quiz or present an oral magazine. In the process of this daily, purposeful communication, the officers' prestige grows in the eyes of their subordinates, and the latter acquire greater faith in the officers' experience, knowledge and skill, the skill which the soldiers will then acquire from them at the firing ground and the moving target gunnery range for infantry combat vehicles and during the servicing of the equipment.

It is only natural that the platoon commanded by Lieutenant V. Yegorov should be an excellent one. The same can be said of the fact that Lieutenant V. Ulyanov's men, as an example, still have a long way to go to reach this level. This is a result not just of the officer's inadequate methodological training, but also his inability to rely upon the Komsomol aktiv in the daily work. All of this, by the way, is despite the fact that he was elected a member of the company Komsomol bureau and the Komsomol activists have a right to expect from him twice the assistance, advice and interest in their concerns.

Incidentally, Lieutenant V. Ulyanov's work in the elective organ is not just a matter of trust expressed by the Komsomol members, but also a direct party assignment. Just as it is for the officers-and-communists elected to the Komsomol bureau. But do the party members know how the lieutenant is carrying out this

assignment? Let us be frank. The party organizations do not always thoughtfully study or thoroughly assess the contribution made by each to the work of the youth collectives and rarely hold them accountable for not being active in the work of the elective Komsomol organ, even though participation in it is a reserve for developing public activeness in the young communists, a condition for their ideological-political growth and a means of involving them in party-political work. It is simply essential for the party committee and the party organizations to help the Komsomol in this matter.

And what about the Komsomol committee itself? What kind of tools does it have? How can it make the young officers more active? At the present time, it is mainly those who are members of the committee (Lieutenant F. Ilyukov, Senior Lieutenant V. Abbasov and Captain A. Daryushin) who work continuously in the Komsomol. What about the others?

The others carry out individual assignments, as they say. This saving term, which has become entrenched in the vocabulary of the Komsomol secretaries, is frequently used to cover up the real state of affairs. Individual assignments are those which arise as they become necessary. But who should determine the degree of necessity? After all, according to the secretary himself, the committee has more than enough work. Not all of the young officers-and-Komsomol members have assignments, however. What is the matter? Organize the people, get them involved....

I have heard the Komsomol leader say that assignments cannot be issued according to a general list, so to speak.

An assignment randomly and hastily made without taking into account the young officer's abilities and interests can hardly be a real test of his abilities and moral qualities or provide a real return. And so, is the problem not the fact that the committee members still do not have a clear idea of who is capable of what and can therefore not always determine where to apply the efforts of the officers-and-Komsomol members?

A close look at the situation shows that a great deal is lost because of this. We do not have to mention that this affects the day-to-day work of the Komsomol organization. That is obvious. Let us take a broader look at the situation. Let us consider the short but highly meaningful axiom that the Komsomol is the party's reserve. Time will pass. The young officer will develop professionally and grow strong ideologically and morally, and the logic of life itself, the entire system of our ideals and spiritual values will bring him to make the decision to link his destiny with the Lenin party. However, the Komsomol is where he acquires the foundation for those qualities without which a communist is inconceivable. And it is with good reason that the Komsomol organization makes a third recommendation to the new member. It is therefore important when the committee affirms the recommendation for it to be able to vote with complete substantiation and a profound awareness of its responsibility for these two clauses: "we recommend" and "we assign." After all, an assignment can only be made when the individual is known, when he has been tested at the practical level.

The development of a young officer.... This is a highly meaningful and multi-faceted concept. The lieutenant's ideological growth and the extent of his professional maturity are what mainly determine its substance. The All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations stressed the fact that "we need to pay more attention to how the young officer is developing and how well he is acquiring ideological, moral and military maturity, and do more to help the commanders and political workers."

There is something else which cannot be ignored, however: the breadth of the lieutenant's perspective, his range of interests, needs and spiritual values. In fact, the two cannot be separated. After all, the officer's depth of thought, his intellect and moral makeup depend upon the diversity of his interests, upon his developing the habit of constantly working to improve himself. The Komsomol committees do not always have a clear idea of how the lieutenant fills his personal time, however, and do not take full advantage of opportunities for shaping his aesthetic taste. Leisure time is not a time for idleness, after all. And the Komsomol organization cannot be indifferent as to how it is filled.

I inquired at the unit library about what the young officers are reading. It turned out that only three of 15 people are on the library list. And they have checked out only four or five books.

The officers themselves are primarily to blame for this, of course. And we should stress the fact that a shortage of time is clearly not a valid excuse. It is reasonable to ask another question, however: How close is the contact between the Komsomol committee and library workers? What is it doing to publicize the best works of Soviet literature, particularly political and military literature? Sometimes only three to five officers show up for the Book Day regularly conducted by the library workers.

These are far from secondary questions, as might appear at first glance. The broader the young officer's interests, the richer and more interesting will be his spiritual world, the greater will be his prestige among his subordinates and the more possibilities he will have for performing the indoctrinational work with them, because the vital and inwardly rich individual with a well-rounded education automatically attracts people, evokes respect for him and a desire to emulate him in the best sense of this word.

...A lieutenant has arrived in the unit. What will his first steps in the service be like? This depends both upon him and upon those around him, those expected to help him acquire experience in training and indoctrinating subordinates and methodological skill. The Komsomol committee does not have the last role in this matter. And this role should be influential.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

WORK WITH PERSONNEL SHOULD BE PRIORITY FOR TECHNICAL OFFICER

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNKH SIL in Russian No 12, Jun 85 (Signed to press 4 Jun 85) pp 63-67

[Article by Maj V. Pilipchatin, deputy tank regiment commander in charge of equipment: "A Skilled Specialist, but as a Teacher?"

[Text] One evening Lieutenant O. Babich reported to me that all of the tanks were ready for the exercises. The next morning, however, I learned that the departure of two of the vehicles for the field had been delayed. I went to learn what had happened. The lieutenant met me with a guilty look on his face and reported that the repair work was in full swing and would soon be completed. I could see that he had not been idle. His face was flushed, his hands were oily, and wrenches smeared with lubricant protruded from a pocket of his coveralls.

Junior Sergeants N. Bolvin and D. Azizov, tank driving instructors, glanced cautiously in our direction. They were not rushing the repairs but were waiting for Babich. Probably noticing the surprise on my face, the lieutenant gestured toward them with his hand:

"I no longer trust them. I'll finish the job myself in no time. Yesterday I told them twice to check for leaks. They did not even bother to look under the transmission cover, although they reported that everything was in order."

"But why didn't you check things out in good time?" I asked.

"I was completely tied up, Comrade Major. There are a lot of vehicles, but only one of me. And you know yourself that each one of them has to be checked out personally."

Babich went back to the tanks and began working again. It was not long before the combat vehicles, engines revved up, departed for the route. One should have been happy, it would seem, but for some reason I could not shake my feeling of concern....

I returned to the unit and continued thinking about Babich. Although he is a young specialist, he has a good grasp of things. He knows the equipment. He does not always know the men, however. His statement, "I no longer trust them"

alarmed me. In our work, after all, little can be achieved without mutual trust, without the ability to get close to a person. This was not the first time that Bolvin and Azizov had not serviced the vehicles in good time or had not done a conscientious job. How had Babich reacted? The lieutenant had given his men another "dressing down," rolled up his sleeves and begun the repair work himself. He did not always have enough time and frequently had to hurry. Naturally, the job had not been improved by his haste.

Babich is just beginning his service as an officer. He is young, and the youth make mistakes. It is one thing to make mistakes because of inexperience, however, and another to consciously adhere to the incorrect principle: "The equipment is my main job. Let other people indoctrinate the men." You will not see the lieutenant conducting a talk with the fightingmen. You will rarely hear him speak at a Komsomol meeting and will not catch him having a confidential discussion with his subordinates. I do not want to say that I'm the only one who notices all of this, that I am the only one troubled by this attitude of the young officer. Communists and officers P. Baylupov and V. Yasinovskiy have talked with him more than once and advised him to regard his men as more than mere executors of his orders (remove, repair, adjust, wash, replace), to understand their personalities and moods. They have attempted to give him indoctrinational assignments, but he has always declined:

"I am up to my ears in work. Give me a break."

And they do give him a break. They can all see that the lieutenant is busy with the equipment from morning to night, and this is endless work, demanding exceptional ability and physical strength. The officer never refuses to take on the dirtiest jobs. He gets even more excited, and I have noticed this more than once, when he encounters some sort of "puzzle" while repairing a vehicle. But one man cannot do everything. It is not just the deputy commander for technical affairs who is responsible for the condition of the tanks. The collective, the specific men to whom the vehicles are entrusted, are also responsible. And unfortunately, the handling of the job by certain specialists leaves a lot to be desired. Sergeant N. Panov did not check the transmission fluid level: "I forgot." Junior Sergeant V. Yurchenko failed to adjust the track tension: "I thought that it was good enough." Sergeant Yu. Bashlay did not check at the right time to see that a speedometer was working: "You can't keep up with everything...." And when the lieutenant should have strictly punished his subordinate, he only reproved the latter mildly. Where he should have issued an order and demanded that it be executed, he almost begged. When he should have looked into a matter tactfully and explained to an inexperienced specialist what he had done wrong, he gave reign to his nerves and exploded with anger. There is a direct connection between all of these deficiencies and the state of the equipment in the company (and it has to draw some criticism).

Major A. Bezusov, deputy commander for technical affairs, serves in one of the battalions in our regiment. It is sometimes said that he knows the combat vehicle inside out. And there is a measure of truth in that statement. Aleksandr Petrovich is an excellent specialist in his work. This is not his only strength, however. I speak of him because some of our technical specialists, including Lieutenant Babich, could (and should!) learn from him the ability to work with the men, to be a competent indoctrinator and subtle psychologist. Indoctrinational

work with the subordinates is just as natural for Bezusov as his "dear" equipment. In fact, he has never actually separated the two.

Soon after Sergeant A. Duma arrived in the subunit, Bezusov became aware of both the specialist's technical competence and his conscientiousness. Duma received a vehicle "with long service" and many thousands of kilometers behind it. When the mechanic/driver received the vehicle, the officer did not fail to notice the fact that the longer Duma inspected the tank, the more markedly the usual cheerfulness faded from his eyes. Bezusov understood his subordinate's state of mind. There was a vast amount of work ahead, and the commander had set a short deadline for its completion. One would naturally become upset in that situation. Aleksandr Petrovich precisely defined the procedure for performing the work and reassured the mechanic/driver.

Once, when the sergeant returned from mess to the pool, he was considerably surprised to see the battalion deputy commander for technical affairs intently "performing magic" on his tank engine.

"You have performed the adjustment work well," the major said, wiping his greasy hands with a rag. "I wouldn't be ashamed to try to learn something from you."

Words such as these are sometimes more precious than the highest commendation.

That evening Bezusov went back to Duma's tank, gave him several pieces of advice and helped the sergeant with the work. Their common concern kept them at the pool until a late hour. The senior comrade's empathy touched Duma:

"Comrade Major, you should rest up now. You have a family waiting for you at home, after all. I'll give it everything I have. I can finish it on time."

"I don't doubt that at all!" Bezusov said.

The tank left for the route on the day designated by the commander. The pure and even rumbling of its engine was the most beautiful of songs for Duma. And Bezusov saw to it that the event did not go unnoticed in the collective. He came up with some kind and sincere words to say to a battalion formation, noting the sergeant's conscientious, responsible handling of the assigned job, and expressed gratitude to the mechanic/driver.

A word of encouragement inspires an individual. And when the news spread among the regimental subunits that Sergeant Aleksandr Duma had operated his tank to the point of major overhaul without intermediate repairs, I knew very well that Major Bezusov had led his charge in this great achievement. And he had something to do with the fact that other mechanic/drivers--Senior Sergeants V. Vasilchishin, A. Sadykov...--picked up on this initiative of benefit to the combat readiness.

Not long ago Aleksandr Petrovich and I worked together on vehicle maintenance day. His relations with the fightingmen, even what might appear to be secondary details, revealed the insightful and thoughtful indoctrinator in him.

When he inspected the specialists in the formation, for example, he ordered several soldiers to go back to the barracks and get their coveralls into proper condition. One man had missing buttons, another had a torn pocket, and the coveralls of a third were too dirty. He saw more than just sloppiness on the part of the tankment behind these "petty details." After all, sloppiness of dress can quickly lead to carelessness in the work.

When he passed by one of the vehicles, the major just happened to overhear a conversation between Senior Lieutenant A. Belimenko, platoon commander, and a mechanic/driver. He stood there and listened for awhile, then called Belimenko aside. Aleksandr Petrovich did not like the way the senior lieutenant treated the subordinates almost as equals. He had noticed this more than once. There had been cases in which Belimenko tried "not to see" certain omissions in the performance of his subordinates, in their work on the equipment, in their conduct. He excused them. Bezusov rapidly arrived at a diagnosis of this "illness." The mechanics/drivers have a large role in supporting the training process. The officer had apparently decided that he would have fewer problems if he were lenient toward the blunders of his subordinates. When some of the specialists saw this, they began taking advantage of the senior lieutenant's loyalty for other than the best motives. And so Bezusov wanted to put everyone back into his own place. He worked long and persistently with Belimenko. He had his way, however.

At the end of vehicle maintenance day the major asked the company officers which of the fightingmen, in their opinion, deserved to be commended.

"I don't have any specific thoughts about that yet," was Lieutenant A. Yurchenko's answer. "They all did a good job."

This alerted Bezusov. He said:

"Why not commend mechanic/instructor Sergeant Aligashiyev, for example? He did the job better and faster than anyone else, after all."

"It would be alright to commend Aligashiyev...," the lieutenant said with a shrug of his shoulders.

"I can't understand that attitude," the major told me with agitation. "The men worked their fingers to the bone, and not a good word to say about anyone! Isn't this what sometimes makes the specialists apathetic and unenthusiastic, if not actually indifferent, toward the work?"

Yet another indoctrinational problem has arisen for the major. He will not regard it with indifference. I know that for sure.

I recall many other instances in which I have seen Bezusov not just as the specialist with the golden touch, but also as a skillful and concerned indoctrinator. It was he who came to the regimental party committee one time and "insisted" on presenting a lecture on conservation and thrift. He could not remain indifferent with respect to how certain soldiers and sergeants were

using the supplies entrusted to them, so inefficiently. It was he who worked with the soldiers in the middle of the night when it was 20° below freezing to set up a warming station at the range, although they had completed a march of many kilometers. It was he who spoke up when a subunit first sergeant brought cold food out to the tank training ground. It was he who helped a soldier who had been removed from operating a tank regain his good name and rise to the level of the best specialist in the unit.

No matter how much we talk about and demonstrate the commonly known fact that it is essential and mandatory for the technical specialists to participate in the indoctrinal work, the problem will not go away by itself. And life insistently demands that it be resolved. When we fail to involve the officers at this level in the important task, we are depriving ourselves of yet another good opportunity to influence the consciousness of the men who shape the combat readiness. The battalion party bureau in which Captain A. Aksenov is secretary, once made a study of the technical specialists' participation in the indoctrinal work performed with the personnel. The picture which emerged was not a comforting one. It was "insistently recommended" that those who were remaining aloof from the indoctrination of the personnel conduct talks and study the moods and personalities of their subordinates. The decision was carried out. Without enthusiasm, however, without any desire, in a strictly routine manner. Why? Because it is a difficult art to simultaneously combine the qualities of a good specialist and a teacher. They are not mastered in a single session, because one desires them or just because a directive has been issued. The art has to be studied. One must feel a deep personal need for it.

The development of technical specialists as indoctrinators depends to an enormous degree upon the commanders, political workers and party organizations. This is not an abstract conclusion. I base it primarily on myself, on my own personal experience. I recall very well arriving as a young lieutenant in the unit together with classmates from the school. We were cordially greeted by Major Vasiliy Ivanovich Rudenko, deputy regimental commander for technical affairs. The first time he talked with us, he asked us the following question:

"In your opinion, what is the most important thing on a vehicle"?

"The engine," came the answer.

"The armament."

"Speed and maneuverability."

The major smiled slyly:

"I do not agree, comrades. The main thing on a vehicle is human beings."

This is how he felt, and this was the principle by which he worked. And he very frequently taught us "greenhorn deputies for technical affairs" lessons of pedagogical wisdom. I shall never forget the following incident. It was just prior to an exercise during the winter. Rudenko was slightly ill. I visited him at his home. When we parted, Rudenko gave me a pair of warm mittens.

"Please give these to the mechanic/driver of the command vehicle. His hands were frostbitten one time."

I took the mittens to the subunit, thinking about the situation with irritation: "How was it that I, the company's deputy commander for technical affairs, knew less about my men than the regimental deputy for technical affairs"?

I recall yet another incident in which I was directly involved. I had punished a mechanic/driver for not cleaning the engine's oil filters in good time. The sergeant tried to explain, but I was so annoyed that I did not think it necessary to hear the man out.

Rudenko came up to me soon after that and said that I had made a big mistake. The mechanic/driver had just returned from the hospital and was physically incapable of doing the work. Another specialist had been negligent. He was the one who should have been punished.

"What can I do?" I asked.

"What do you mean?" the major asked with surprise. "Go and apologize to the man. There is no other way."

My arrogance came out: Why should I, a lieutenant, apologize to a sergeant? Vasiliy Ivanovich insisted, however. After apologizing, I realized perhaps for the first time that fairness can only strengthen an officer's prestige in the eyes of both his subordinates and his superiors.

Addressing a meeting of the unit communists not long ago, the regimental commander made an acute issue of participation in the indoctrinational work with the personnel on the part of the technical officer, of the fact that they should not close themselves off within the sphere of their own, purely technical concerns. A study made by the party committee showed that this category of communists is still not demonstrating proper activeness or the essential pedagogical skill. I cannot say that the subunit party organizations are not seeking ways to bring influence on the resolution of the problem. It is discussed at party meetings and during the presentation of reports by the communists at meetings of the regimental party committee and the subunit party bureaus. All of this is unquestionably producing a certain benefit.

In my opinion, however, the main thing is still the individual work performed with those who by virtue of their type of service must possess good pedagogical skill. A study of specific situations and conflicts and of the techniques employed by the communists in their indoctrinational work, their knowledge of the fundamentals of military pedagogics and psychology and of the personalities of the men with whom they work are all questions which must receive the attention of the party activists. Only in this case can we expect a good return.

Like any other officer or warrant officer, the technical specialist influences his subordinates not just with the thoroughness of his professional ability and

his authority, but also with his moral makeup. This fact does not have to be demonstrated. It cruelly punishes those who forget it, however. The officer and warrant officer constantly have to be teaching the fightingmen something, while simultaneously indoctrinating them. Can people seriously heed one who advocates irreproachable performance efficiency, however, while himself violating discipline before the eyes of subordinates? Captain I. Bugnya, a deputy company commander for technical affairs, did not show his best side during the performance of a task in the combat vehicle pool. He was disciplined for inefficiency and negligence. A few days later it became necessary for the captain to bring to strict account for carelessness a soldier who had negligently serviced a vehicle. The officer assigned the task to a junior commander, however. He confessed that he could not be strictly demanding with an individual in front of whom he had been guilty of the same sort of negligence a few days previously.

The student will not always tell the teacher in such a case: "But you did the same thing...." No one can prevent the individual from thinking that, however. I believe that the conclusion is clear: Only he who has an irreproachable moral image can be a truly demanding and principled indoctrinator.

I would like to say a word about one other important aspect of this problem. The indoctrinator must exercise moderation both with respect to strictness and in his kindness. Excessive demandingness, inappropriate for the occasion, sometimes only reduces the individual's work. Infinite or phony kindness, on the other hand, is detrimental to the indoctrinational work. The following is a specific example.

Warrant Officer N. Makarkin serves as platoon commander in our regiment's repair subunit. He belongs to that category of master specialists sometimes known as "local legends." Indeed, with respect to working on a lathe, for example, Makarkin is without equal in the entire formation. He is a specialist of unsurpassed competence to his subordinates. A good nature and a desire to find a compromise in any conflict stand out most vividly among the warrant officer's personal qualities. Diplomacy and flexibility in service and personal relations are a useful quality, to be sure. It has to be intelligently applied, however.

The platoon commander assigned several fightingmen the task of installing electrical sockets at one of the facilities. It had not been accomplished by the time specified. In order to avoid a conflict with the company commander (and spoiling his relations with subordinates) the warrant officer... set about the job himself. From any standpoint this was not the best thing to do. Some of the men have become accustomed to this attitude on the part of the platoon commander and do not overly burden themselves to perform efficiently. Is this not why, when the warrant officer issues an order, he frequently waits with trepidation at the designated time for the report that it has been carried out?

We frequently say that training and indoctrination constitute a single process, putting into these words the profound meaning of a pedagogical principle which has reliably passed the test of life. Only that armed defender of the homeland

in whom ideological conviction, great military skill and moral purity are organically merged can be truly mature. Everyone responsible for training the fightingmen, everyone who passes on his knowledge and experience to them must achieve this mergence.

To know one's job to perfection, to be a skillful organizer and indoctrinator, to know how to get close to the people--these are the demands made of the cadres by the party today. They fully apply also to the officers, including those in the engineering and technical field. All of us senior chiefs, political workers, party and Komsomol activists must therefore strive persistently to see that every military engineer is both an excellent specialist and a skilled indoctrinator.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

DEP CHIEF PSYCHIATRIST ON EFFECTS OF ALCOHOL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Aug 85 p 4

[Article by Col Med Serv G. Kolupayev, doctor of medical sciences, deputy chief psychiatrist of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "A Dangerous Habit"]

[Text] Today, everyone understands that drunkenness is a serious social evil. However, far from everyone fully realizes what harm even a small dose of alcohol can do to your health and to what terrible consequences addiction to drinking can lead. Many believe that regular consumption of alcoholic drinks does not at all necessarily lead to alcoholism. This is a naive delusion! There also exists an ignorant opinion that supposedly dry wine or beer is not only harmless, but "restores health," eliminates fatigue, increases efficiency and so forth. However, according to data of the World Health Organization, alcohol is the leading causes of death and deterioration of health, surpassing cardiovascular diseases and cancer. I think that the light-minded attitude towards drinking often comes from not knowing the characteristics of alcohol and its destructive effects on a person, down to physical and mental degradation of the personality.

One of the insidious characteristics of alcohol is that the physical and mental dependency on it develops gradually, little by little, and at first is not noticeable either to the drinker himself or to those around him. The person who reaches for the wine-glass hardly thinks that the path to alcoholism begins with the desire to "mark" some or other event, to welcome a guest "at the highest standard" or with what appear to be harmless glasses "for the appetite." Frequent libations soon have their effect: there arises a pathological need for alcoholic drinks and a desire to take a drink "the morning-after"--an obvious symptom of chronic intoxication of the organism with alcohol. As a rule, this dangerous path from everyday drunkenness to alcoholism is not long.

Just why does the power of alcoholic drinks turns out at times to be stronger than reason? This is the sinister essence of alcohol (ethyl or wine alcohol): it belongs to a group of narcotic substances which are neural poisons. It can be compared to a narcotic such as morphine: the mechanism of gradual habituation are identical. Under the influence of alcohol, individual personality traits of a person initially are emphasized, then it is as if they smooth down and level off--it is as if drunks imitate each other. Their

critical attitude toward their own actions becomes dull, and the most unfortunate this is that nervous and mental disorders are inevitable. A person becomes weak-willed, oversensitively proud, often resentful and aggressive. Furthermore, a person's attention and sharpness of wit decrease, speech and walk are irregular, and he becomes talkative and overestimates his own strengths. This is often the cause of traffic, industrial and domestic injuries.

Scientific studies also confirm this cruel conclusion: The death rate among drunkards and alcoholics is triple that of people not taking alcoholic drinks. There is not a single organ which would not suffer from alcohol. Under the influence of alcohol the activities of the heart, blood vessels, lungs, kidneys, spleen, the gastrointestinal tract and internal secretion organs change and all types of metabolism are upset. However, the greatest destructive effect of alcohol is felt on the nervous system and, above all, on its highest section--the brain. This is explained by the fact that brain cells are rich in lipoids--fatty substances which are easily dissolved in alcohol. Because of this, alcohol quickly penetrates inside a nerve cell and changes its function. After a short time, the control functions of the cortex are lost.

Already the first glass of alcohol causes appreciable damage to the heart. An ingredient of alcohol--ethanol--has a direct toxic effect on the myocardium and contributes to the formation of growth areas of connective tissue. As a result, the contracting capability of the heart muscle decreases, which leads to heart inefficiency. The tone and inflation of blood vessels, the frequency, strength and often the rhythm of heart contractions change, and blood pressure increases. An analysis of the causes of sudden death of people under the age of 40 showed that acute coronary insufficiency often was preceded by drinking.

Overindulgences in alcohol also contribute to the early development of arteriosclerosis. Drinkers, as a rule, have an increased blood coagulability, which leads to blood clots.

A vulnerable target of alcohol is the liver, each cell of which is a miniature chemical factory. Its share of work is truly titanic: to oxidize, process and neutralize toxic substances formed in an organism or coming from the outside. It is namely in the liver that up to 90 percent of the alcohol entering the body is oxidized. With systematic abuse of it, many vitally important functions of the liver are affected: secretion of bile to the intestines, without which normal digestion is impossible; participation in carbohydrate, protein and fatty metabolism; the activities of coagulating and anticoagulating systems of the blood are disrupted; finally, various substances are not sufficiently neutralized. This results in poisoning of the organism with toxins accumulated in the blood and to irreversible changes in the liver itself--alcoholic cirrhosis.

Alcoholic drinks cause burns and irritations to the mucous membrane of the mouth, esophagus, stomach and other sections of the gastrointestinal tract. Practically all drinkers suffer from gastritis to some degree. Occurrence of cancer of the esophagus, larynx or the mouth cavity in patients with chronic

alcohol intoxication is 10-15 times higher than in non-drinkers. Lung disease, and especially pneumonia, is encountered in drinkers 3-4 times as often.

Alas, one can go on forever with the dismal list of illnesses to which the dangerous habit of alcohol consumption inevitably leads. Atonement for weak will comes sooner or later. For us in the medical profession, drunks are becoming the most serious patients, but for society they are an economic and moral burden. Therefore, today it cannot be a question of how to treat those who are balancing on the edge of the wine-glass and who, ignoring the sober way of life, are led by the drunken evil. General abstention from alcohol must become the standard of life for everyone.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

REVIEW: RYABOV ON 'F. ENGELS AND THE FLEET'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 85 pp 88-89

[Review by Capt 1st Rank A. Galkin, candidate of naval sciences and docent, of the book "F. Engels i flot" (F. Engels and the Fleet) by F.G. Ryabov, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1984, 125 pages]

[Text] Friedrich Engels was one of the founders of scientific communism and made an invaluable contribution to the elaboration of military questions, which occupy an important place in the theory of Marxism and in the revolutionary praxis of the proletariat. Part of his general work on military affairs, on which V.I. Lenin described him as a great expert, involved the study of naval wars, naval art and the history of naval fleets. These issues are dealt with to one degree or another in approximately 300 of F. Engels' works (some of them written jointly with K. Marx), his speeches and letters. They contain an orderly system of views on the navy, on its history and prospects for its development. F. Ryabov's book, published by Voyenizdat, reveals these views of F. Engels.

It seems only natural that the book begins with a chapter which analyzes the works of F. Engels as the basis for demonstrating his most serious interest in diverse questions pertaining to the navy, naval wars, shipbuilding, navigation and maritime trade. The existence of numerous comments on future prospects for naval operations, information on military vessels, coastal fortresses, the naval artillery and so forth, not to mention the authoritative assessment of military operations at sea, in the articles and correspondence of K. Marx's great comrade-in-arms, permits the author to conclude that Engels constantly followed the situation in the navies and the development of naval equipment and tactics in the special literature.

The fact that the Marxist classic paid this kind of attention to naval matters is perfectly understandable. The navy was firmly in a leading position at that time in the use of power units, electrical equipment and navigational equipment. A dependency upon social development, the economy and technology can be seen more clearly in the navy than in other areas of military affairs. Furthermore, the navy itself always had a great influence upon the economic development of states and upon their industry.

In the second chapter the author reveals a clearly defined concept of the history of the navy's development, beginning with the early period of its existence, which is contained in the works of F. Engels. This concept, the book states, is original in that Engels was the first to view the history of the navy in connection with the society's economic and political needs, with the development of industry, trade and navigation. It is also novel in its division of history into periods, based, also for the first time, on progress in technology and weaponry.

The materialistic approach to the problem permitted Engels, the book makes it clear, to divide the entire history of navies (up to middle of the second half of the 19th century) into five stages: the rowed fleet of antiquity (from the appearance of the first military vessels of the emerging state to the middle of the first millennium of our era); the fleet of the first vessels with keels and sails and rowed vessels (5th-7th-15th centuries); the regular sail-type fleet armed with artillery (15th to beginning of 19th century); the steam-and-sail fleet (1820's to beginning of 1860's); the ironclad fleet (from 1862 on). All of these stages correspond to main landmarks in the history of society's development and brilliantly reveal the famous thesis of Marxist military theory that nothing depends upon economic circumstances as much as the army and navy,

Each chapter contains such examples of F. Engels' consideration of the problems of the navy and of military art on the basis of general history, dialectically, in their universal linkage and development and in their advance through conflicts. This makes it possible for our military cadres to use the book as a school, as it were, for applying Marxist theory in the specific, special area of knowledge, to serve as clear proof of its universality and universal significance.

The third chapter shows that the main subjects of F. Engels' reflections were recent innovations in military equipment and armaments. Within a brief period of time he studied the design of the ironclad gun-deck frigates, their artillery armament and operating tactics, and successfully predicted that they would not last long as a result of an unresolved conflict: the armoring of ships with old design principles and their arming with rifled artillery.

Ahead of the professional designers of his time, Engels put forth in his 1863 article, "Comments on Artillery in America," the idea of building ironclad cruisers with a large displacement and great speed, and placing turret-type artillery units on the centerlines of ships. It is notable that construction cruisers with these characteristics were begun in Russia and France and then in England only at the beginning of the 1880's.

That same piece expressed the idea for the first time that the fleet should include various classes and types of ships capable of supplementing one another. The author points out that Engels proposed that which we now call a balanced fleet capable of performing the most diverse combat missions. Engels' opinion on this matter has been confirmed by Soviet military science, which orients the general line in the building of the USSR Navy toward the building of a balanced fleet.

In the next chapter the author thoroughly reveals the distinguishing feature of F. Engels' thoughts on problems of naval art--a strictly scientific attitude toward the experience of past wars. This attitude permitted him to correctly assess the state of naval forces for that period and to correctly describe prospects for the development of the combat employment of fleets in the future.

Engels used examples from past wars to demonstrate that the navy could provide considerable support for the army: either in the landing of forces in the enemy's rear area or going around his coastal flank to develop the success in an offensive by ground forces, or the fleet could contain an enemy offensive. Furthermore, operations by ground forces in a coastal theater are inconceivable in general without supplies delivered by sea. "In a coastal theater," the author emphasizes Engels' conclusion, "an army is made strong by the aid of the navy. He who dominates at sea will dominate on the coast."

Analyzing events of the Crimean War of 1853-1856, Engels could make out their nature, which was concealed in the debris of reports. He discovered errors on the part of British, French and Turkish admirals such as the scattering of forces, the absence of unified planning and coordination, delays, indecisiveness, neglect of interaction with ground forces and the inability to single out the main axis of an operation. At the same time, he gave a high rating to the attack by Russian sailors in the Sinop Engagement and called the actions of P.S. Nakhimov's squadron determined and vigorous.

Engels included the battle on lines of naval communications in the most important strategic mission, or, as the author writes, "he assigned the most important place to the battle against the enemy's maritime trade." Based on the definitive influence of weapons and equipment upon military art, he also insisted that military ships could conduct successful combat operations against fortresses. Ships with powerful artillery could accomplish this mission.

The author demonstrates that Engels' predictions about the future development of the navy and its role in future wars have been brilliantly confirmed in military operations at sea in the 20th century. These operations have convincingly demonstrated the correctness of the first Marxist military theoretician's views and the baselessness of the premises of many bourgeois scholars of the 19th and 20th centuries.

F. Ryabov's book, which contains an in-depth analysis of F. Engels' works on the navy and military operations at sea, is a successful attempt to clearly and thoroughly demonstrate history's first example of the application of materialistic dialectics to the analysis of naval matters. This publication will unquestionably contribute to the ideological and professional training of Soviet officers.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

BOOK REVIEW: GAREYEV'S 'M.V. FRUNZE -- MILITARY THEORIST'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 12, Jun 85 (Signed to press 4 Jun 85) pp 88-90

[Review by Maj Gen I. Lyutov, doctor of military sciences and professor, of the book "M.V. Frunze -- voyenny teoretik" (M.V. Frunze -- Military Theoretician), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1985, 448 pages)]

[Text] In order to properly accomplish the contemporary tasks of military science and praxis, it is extremely important for the officer cadres to constantly consult sources on the work performed by our party to establish Soviet military theory and on the dialectics of its development. A book published by Voenizdat on M.V. Frunze's work in military theory contains valuable information on these problems. Its author, Doctor of Military Sciences and Colonel General M.A. Gareyev, uses extensive material from original sources to thoroughly demonstrate what sociopolitical factors and military events shaped Frunze as an important military theoretician.

The monograph is distinguished by an original approach to the analysis of Frunze's theoretical military views. They are considered mainly from the standpoint of their conformity to those historical conditions under which he produced his most important works on Soviet military doctrine and military science, military training and indoctrination, how well they have stood the test of time and the directions taken by their continued development. The most important aspect of the book's content lies in the fact that it shows the sources of our military theory's vitality and general methodological questions pertaining to the relationship of military science and military art, the organizational development and training of the army and navy, questions which have retained their validity and value for accomplishing contemporary tasks in military affairs.

The study is executed in strict chronological order and embraces the main phases in M.V. Frunze's revolutionary and military activities, his elaboration of basic problems of unified Soviet military doctrine and military science after the end of the civil war and the building of the Armed Forces, and the related problems of military training and indoctrination. A special place is allocated for describing the main directions taken in the development of Lenin's concepts and M.V. Frunze's thoughts in the contemporary body of knowledge on war and the army, as well as for substantiating the most promising directions for further improving and developing Soviet military science and for military-scientific work in the Armed Forces.

As the author indicated the origins of Frunze's development as a military theoretician, he succeeded in authenticating the fact that as Mikhail Vasilyevich was directly involved in the Moscow armed uprising of 1905, he studied and summarized the course of that uprising, the experience in barricade battles and strikes, the organization, the training and actions of armed workers' detachments and the militia. In order to gain a more thorough understanding of the causes of the successes and defeats in the uprising, he persistently studied literature on military history, devoting special attention to F. Engles' book "Anti-Duhring" and to his works on military matters. It was precisely Mikhail Vasilyevich's thorough absorption of these which permitted him to assess military events occurring in the world from a class standpoint and on the basis of Marxist concepts.

M.V. Frunze's skillful employment of the Marxist dialectical method for assessing the complex operational situation and for thoroughly considering the enemy's weak and strong points permitted him to serve 2 years on the civil war fronts as commander of an army and an army group and then as commander of a number of fronts without losing a single operation. His ability to accurately determine the axis for the main thrust, to build up and concentrate powerful strike forces there, mainly out of subordinate armies located at the forward edge, to designate reserves and commit them to action at the right time were distinguishing features of Frunze's brand of military leadership.

These qualities did not come about by themselves. Mikhail Vasilyevich acquired them through multifaceted and intensive independent study. V.I. Lenin's demand that the proletariat seriously study military affairs was an immutable law for Frunze.

Nor could we fail to underscore the conclusion, also presented in the book, that M.V. Frunze was one of the most convinced, skilled, disciplined and creative executors of decisions of the party and the Soviet state, that he was always able to merge with the work of party and soviet organs, to use their power and influence in the masses for accomplishing the most important practical tasks.

After the civil war ended, during the years of peaceful construction, the party focused its main attention on the restoration and development of the national economy and attached great importance to strengthening its defense capability. At that time, however, the actions of Trotsky and his henchmen were hampering efforts to build-up the Red Army's combat strength. The monograph thoroughly reveals M.V. Frunze's role in the battle against Trotskyite distortions of the party line on military matters, specifically decisions adopted at its 11th Congress with respect to reorganizing the Red Army and developing a unified military doctrine.

The content of those sections in the book which describe the methods used by M.V. Frunze in his work as a military scholar, a theoretician and the organizer of military-scientific work in the Red Army is instructive. He was one of the most active writers for the military press, attached great importance to its use for publicizing Marxist-Leninist knowledge and ideas on military

matters, helped newspaper and magazine workers raise the ideological and theoretical level of their articles and encouraged his deputies and workers in the central apparatus, commanders and political workers in the forces to speak out in military periodicals. It is noteworthy that M.V. Frunze never made his military-scientific work a goal in itself. It always stemmed from the creative nature of his practical endeavors. His theoretical elaborations of the most important basic questions were essentially an inseparable part of his service praxis, and this explains their vitality and great effectiveness.

The productiveness of Mikhail Vasilevich's military-theoretical work resulted not just from his talent as a scholar, but also from his unceasing study of Marxist-Leninist theory, his desire to understand all of the subtleties of the scientific problem himself and his creative performance of practical tasks, and was also the ultimate embodiment of the enormous experience acquired by him during the civil war years and following the war.

The profound scientific nature and communist party-mindedness of M.V. Frunze's theoretical works were achieved, the author points out, as a result of his strict adherence to the most valuable Marxist-Leninist traditions. They involved extreme scrupulousness and conscientiousness in the selection and summarization of facts, attention to the formulation of conclusions and their thorough substantiation, publicizing the discussion of the most important issues and respect for the convincing conclusions and arguments of his opponents in the discussions.

Carefully studying original sources and the memoirs of the military leader's friends and companions-in-arms in the party and military work, the author of the book reveals M.V. Frunze's work style while serving as People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. Before important, basic questions were resolved, they were ordinarily elaborated and discussed, and various points of view on the issues were brought out and taken into account. However, the people's commissar opposed endless coordination and the drawn-out study of secondary, supplementary material. He was convinced that bold, even far-reaching decisions are frequently made contrary to the opinion and despite the resistance of conservative-minded people. He also believed that decisions based on too large compromises and pleasing everyone are ordinarily weak or useless. As a result of this approach, Mikhail Vasilevich was firm with respect to adopting decisions and implementing them once the essence of the matter was clear and serious discussion had been completed. The book cites the following fact as an example. All of the most important measures pertaining to the reorganization of the war department's central apparatus were carefully considered and discussed, worked out in their final form and actually implemented within a few weeks, despite the fact that there was no unified opinion on the issues.

Although the main objective of this work was to reveal M.V. Frunze's personality as a military theoretician, the author--and with complete justification--does not rigidly classify his main military-theoretical works. He explains that this is because almost everyone of them described to the extent that it was necessary various aspects of Soviet military doctrine, military art, the organizational development of the Armed Forces and the training and indoctrination of commanders, political cadres and the Red Army masses. Furthermore,

Frunze the theoretician devoted most of his attention to revealing the total aggregate of the problems on the basis of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, to describing the nature of a future war and working out a unified military doctrine as the most important condition for successful action by the party, the state and all military cadres with respect to preparing the Armed Forces and the nation as a whole for a possible war.

A considerable place in the book is given over to revealing M.V. Frunze's views on one of the basic questions of military theory and praxis--the nature and the relationship of military science and military art. We would point out that many scientific works and statements by a number of military theoreticians today treat this matter in different ways, frequently not entirely accurately. Some of them regard military science and military art as mechanical components differing in the quantity and extent of the questions studied, while others equate the concepts.

The book demonstrates that M.V. Frunze was even at that time taking the only correct, Marxist-Leninist approach to this problem in many of his works. He used the terms "military science" and "military art" in the sense of two aspects of military affairs. Mikhail Vasilyevich authenticated military science as a field of theoretical research based on the summarization of experience in preparing for and conducting a war. He considered its main task to be that of revealing the general and essentially homogeneous in the complex phenomena of warfare and the development on this basis of methods of preparing for and conducting it. He regarded military art as the area of application of theoretical knowledge on the practical level for accomplishing specific tasks in various situations. In addition to its practical aspect, military art also has general theoretical tenets which are a part of military science. Unity of military science and the praxis of military art and the thorough clarification of their specific nature and most significant interdependencies continue to be the most important and urgent matter in military affairs in the contemporary situation.

We know that there is controversy even today about the contemporary structure of military science, particularly about the validity of including the theory of troop command and control in military science as a separate field of scholarship. The theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces and the theory of military economics and logistics are frequently not included in military science. We also have various descriptions of the structure of military art. The last chapter in the book sheds considerable light on this problem. The structure and the substance of military art proposed by the author reflect the processes and phenomena studied by it with adequate completeness.

It cannot be said, however, that there was adequate substantiation or expediency for the author to include, as an example, the general fundamentals of the theory of operational art as part of "combined-arms operational art." In addition to tenets common to all branches of the Armed Forces, the latter also covers the theory of employment of the Ground Forces. In this version the general fundamentals of operational art are treated as a concept on the same level as the other components (the theories of the operational art of each branch of the Armed Forces, operational logistics and civil defense), and

consequently they cannot have a direct influence upon the latter. For this same reason, the operational art of the formations of each branch of the Armed Forces, as an example, is prevented from having a general theoretical basis, including such a basis in questions of the combat readiness of the troops. In our opinion, it would be expedient to separate the general theoretical tenets into a separate and independent part of both the theory of operational art and the theory of tactics.

The conclusions drawn by the author with respect to further improving military-scientific work, particularly the principles underlying the approach to its organization and the resolution of scientific problems at the contemporary stage, are extremely important. Only one other thing could be desired: More attention should have been given to validating the importance of studying the experience of the Great Patriotic War and certain local wars in matters of organizing and conducting the operation and the battle.

In general, this book will benefit the military reader. The study of M.V. Frunze's military-theoretical legacy makes it possible to gain a more thorough understanding of the laws underlying contemporary processes in the development of military affairs and to creatively accomplish the practical tasks set for the Soviet Armed Forces by the Communist Party.

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WARSAW PACT

RATIFICATION OF EXTENSION OF PACT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 85 p 1

[Article by First Deputy of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
V. Kuzhetcov and Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
T. Menteshashvili: "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet"

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet hereby resolves:

to ratify the Protocol extending the friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance pact of 14 May 1985, submitted by the USSR Council of Ministers for ratification, approved by the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and signed in Warsaw on 26 April 1985 by the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian Peoples Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish Peoples Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic.

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WARSAW PACT

RESULTS OF MILITARY COUNCIL SESSION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 85 p 1

[Text] A regular session of the Military Council of the Warsaw Pact member states chaired by the military commander-in-chief and Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov was held in Budapest, the capital of the Hungarian Peoples Republic, from 20 May through 23 May 1985.

All the members of the Military Council: military delegations from the Bulgarian Peoples Army, the Hungarian Peoples Army, the National Peoples Army of the German Democratic Republic, the Army of Poland, the Army of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Military Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czechoslovakian Peoples Army, as well as generals and officers of the Commander-in-Chief's staff, participated in the work of the Military Council.

The Military Council, proceeding from the contemporary international situation, examined several problems of the practical activity of the unified command to achieve further improvement of the fighting strength of the Combined Armed Forces in light of the decisions made by the states of the Warsaw Pact at the recent meetings of the Political Advisory Committee and the sessions of the Defense Ministers Committee.

The work of the Military Council proceeded in a constructive, business-like spirit and in an atmosphere of military comradeship, friendship, and mutual understanding.

Coordinated recommendation dealing with the problems under examination were approved.

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WARSAW PACT

UNITS MUST COPE WITH EFFECTS OF ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PULSE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt V. Lavrenyuk, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "The Degree of Readiness"]

[Text] A wall of fire and smoke arose in front of the attacking line of tanks. The "enemy" had set up a vast zone of fire barriers. For some time there remained an opportunity to negotiate it by using high speed and the gaps between the pockets of fire. However, the platoon leader Lt V. Iskhakov did not make the decision right away. His hesitation did not last too long, but time was lost nevertheless. Because of this, the "enemy" managed to bring up the reserves. What prevented the tankmen from finding the correct variant of actions? Of course, gaps in psychological preparation for battle. They had never encountered fire barrier zones before.

The degree of readiness for battle... It depends on many factors, including the level of psychological hardening. Where proper attention is given to it, personnel are ready for any situation changes on the battlefield.

At a recent exercise, certain hypothetical situations introduced by the tank battalion commander Capt V. Glagolev proved interesting to me.

The company commanded by Capt V. Bastov was carrying out a combat mission on broken terrain where command and control conditions were made difficult. At the moment the right-flank platoon was behind the mountain slope and, naturally, was not visible to the company commander, the battalion commander gave the input: "The company's radios have broken down."

Is such a situation possible in combat? Under conditions of using weapons of mass destruction it is a real possibility. During a nuclear blast, electromagnetic pulse can knock out radio communications equipment. So, one must be prepared for this.

Capt Glagolev was interested in how the company commander would communicate above all with the right-flank platoon. The crews of this platoon could not orient themselves on the commander's tank or align on him in the extended line.

The officers wasted no time looking for a solution. Platoon leader Lt I. Leydzinskiy marked his location with a signal flare. In response, a flare was sent up by Capt Bastov. They say the signal is received and understood. After a several-second pause, the company commander sent up another flare, this time angled toward the horizon, thereby indicating the direction of attack to the platoon. The company successfully attacked the "enemy" defended post in radio silence and accomplished the mission.

Everything proves to be simple and easy if officers and all personnel work with such hypothetical situations at all exercises. You see, in the final analysis, psychological hardening also involves the state of training and the internal readiness to operate under special conditions.

By way of illustration, many undertakings have originated in the battalion related to actions under conditions of the enemy using highly accurate weapons--modern reconnaissance strike complexes. Smoke screens, the simplest thermal and infra-red traps, setting up decoy areas... It is understood that in actual combat this all will be combined with protective measures conducted according to the senior commander's plan.

It goes without saying, in the process of searching, not every suggestion withstands the test of practice. Many are eliminated. But the value of creative initiative is not only in what remains for further improvement, but also in educating people in the spirit of constant readiness for actions under complex, critical combat situation conditions and in their moral and psychological hardening.

At another exercise I heard how Maj A. Golovachev talked interestingly about this. He is also a battalion commander.

"Hypothetical situations requiring quickness of wit and resourcefulness of personnel," the battalion commander reflected, "have a special value and develop people's capabilities. By way of illustration, it is known that the firing elevation of tanks is limited. Sometimes in a populated area it is necessary to hit a target located on a hill, but you cannot raise the gun. What is the solution? Most of the tank commanders and gunners found it. They drove onto a boulder or a heap of brick rubble and thereby increased the arc of fire considerably. There are quite a few such "details," sometimes of considerable importance to the outcome of a battle. Personnel must be schooled in them."

These are vital words. The degree of readiness for battle is determined not only by the knowledge of tactics, but also by the ability to solve problems by using keenness of wit, determination and boldness. But these qualities do not come about by themselves.

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CSO: 1801/304

WARSAW PACT

BRIEFS

JOINT EXERCISE IN GDR--The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the GDR National Peoples Army plan to conduct joint training exercises during the period from 6 through 14 July 1985 in the German Democratic Republic in the vicinity of Templin, Magdeburg, Jutebor, and Cottbus. The training exercises are being conducted in order to solve problems of cooperation of the various arms of service. Units and sub-units of ground and air forces with a combined strength of more than 25,000 men will participate in the training exercises.
[Text] [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jun 85 p 4] 12701/13104

CSO: 1801/240

ARMED FORCES

LEADING PERSONNEL PROFILED

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian regularly publishes on page 1 articles entitled "Leading Personnel of the Army and Navy, with individualized subheadings, e.g. "Personal Example" or "Military Innovator" in which promising younger officers are identified. Biographical details are sparse in these articles, but the officer's branch and usually one or two details of his career are reported. The following is a collection of summaries of all such articles appearing between 23 July and 27 August 1985.

Gnetnev, A., Lieutenant Colonel, is the commander of an "excellent" anti-aircraft missile unit in the Belorussian MD. He holds the Order of the Red Star and the Order "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" third class. (27 August 1985, 100-word article by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Savitskiy subtitled "Mark of a Master.")

Gorokhov, Grigoriy Vasilyevich, Colonel, is an engineer specializing in the mechanics of drilling or boring equipment. He worked on a degree at the V.V. Kuybyshev Military-Engineering Academy under Orest Mikhailovich Lushnikov. Gorokhov is credited with 27 inventions, the products of which are said to have been widely introduced into both military and civilian usage. He has also produced dozens of proposed innovations and in particular developed an auger safety casing and various other light drilling devices used by geologists and builders. He was recently awarded the title "Honored Inventor of the Republic." (13 August 1985, 150-word article by Major-General A. Safronov subtitled "Honored Inventor of the Republic.")

Kolyadich, A., Colonel, is a political officer and lecturer with 25 years experience in propaganda work. He is currently serving in the Siberian MD. (20 August 1985, 125-word article by Lieutenant-Colonel N. Fedoseyev subtitled "Lecturer.")

Kuchkov, Nikolay Alekseyevich, Lieutenant-Colonel, is a fighter aviation Pilot 1st Class serving in the Transcaucasus MD under Major General of Aviation Eduard Alekseyevich Shubin (Chief of Staff for Aviation of the Transcaucasus MD). In an unusual departure for this series of articles, the author notes that Kuchkov has been highly praised by the general, as an "eksperimentator" and innovator. (6 August 1985, 125-word article by Captain S. Fedorov subtitled "Squadron Commander.")

Vedernikov, S., Captain-Lieutenant, is the Deputy Commander for Political Affairs on board the submarine "Bryansk Komsomol." He has been awarded the medals for "Combat Service" and "Authoritative Individual." (30 July 1985, 175-word article by Captain-Lieutenant V. Ankov subtitled "The Authority of the Political Worker.")

Volkov, V., Lieutenant-Colonel, is the commander of a detached communications and radio-technical provisioning battalion in the Moscow Air Defense District. He is responsible for airfield support equipment, including long-range and close-in homing equipment, systems for instrument landings and ground control, and aircraft navigational equipment. His is the leading battalion in the district in socialist competition. Volkov holds the Order "For Service to Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" third class. (23 July 1985, 150-word article by Colonel A. Andryushkov subtitled "Fire at the Airfield.")

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CSO: 1801/29

ARMED FORCES

COL GEN BOBYLEV: 'CHANGING WORK' IN PREPARATION FOR CONGRESS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Aug 85 p 2

[Interview with Col Gen S. A. Bobylev, chief of the Political Directorate of the Air Defense Forces, by Col A. Pimenov; date and place not specified]

[Text] Active preparation for the 27th CPSU Congress is underway in the army and navy, and soldiers are persistently struggling to fulfill the pre-congress commitments, which is also indicated by letters to the editor. At the same time, the readers' letters also report that the reorganization of work in the spirit of the requirements advanced by the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum is going slowly, and many problems are being resolved in the old manner. What is the matter here? Col A. Pimenov, editor of the Rocket Forces and Air Defense Forces combat training section of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial staff, interviewed Col Gen S. A. Bobylev, chief of the Political Directorate of the Air Defense Forces and member of the military council, on certain aspects of this problem.

[Question] Readers' attention to the problems of reorganizing work in accordance with today's requirements is indicative primarily of their desire to make a personal contribution to implementing the decisions of the April Party Central Committee Plenum. In your opinion, comrade Col Gen, is most important in this work?

[Answer] The party has adopted a policy of accelerating the country's social and economic development. Now that our goals have been clearly identified and the tasks have been formulated, questions of organizing and educating people and stirring up the human factor have come to the forefront. As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev emphasizes, it is not enough that we can change in economics, management and education if we do not bring about a psychological reorganization and do not develop the desire and ability to think and work in a new way. We see in this the essence of the reorganization--learn to think and work in a new way.

What does this mean? I will not try to talk about all aspects of this extensive, many-sided problem, and it is impossible to do so within the limits of our talk. But I would like to name some of the positions on which we will focus our attention.

One is a person's attitude towards his job. It is no secret that we have quite a few people performing their official duties not what you would call negligently, but, as they say, so-so. And we have developed a tolerant, somewhat indulgent attitude toward this phenomenon. But it cannot be tolerated any longer; it must be decisively eradicated because it impedes forward movement. The sphere of application of our efforts also includes overcoming inertia of thought and adherence to outdated work methods, developing initiative, creative work and a sense of the new, and developing the ability to be guided primarily not by quantitative, but qualitative criteria in evaluating the results of labor. I want to stress that we are trying to resolve these problems in close connection with the tasks of the Air Defense Forces. They are, figuratively speaking, the front-line forces constantly on alert duty, forces which are required to be ready at any minute to engage an airborne enemy.

We see as our most important task everywhere to enhance organization and discipline, radically change the style of activities and strive to see that each person works conscientiously and at his job, putting forth his all. In other words, this is a psychological reorganization of personnel in the spirit of the new requirements. I must say frankly, this is not a simple matter; and this is understandable. You see, this involves decisively breaking outdated stereotypes in the awareness and practical activities of people and abandoning outmoded views and habits. But this does not come easily. Most likely, each of us feels that everyone has to improve their work methods. There is no alternative.

[Question] Is there any progress in this important and complicated matter?

[Answer] There is, although not to the extent I would like and not as much as is needed. Improving work methods is not a natural process; it requires the willful efforts of every worker as well as educational activities aimed at this. We see that if this work is conducted purposefully, energetically and, I would even say, impetuously, it yield results relatively quickly.

Recently we studied the state of affairs at one unit (soyedineniye). Here we observed this very liveliness in the activities of the commander, the political department and party organizations. How was it apparent? In the intensification of educational work and in increasing exactingness and strictness. People related more responsibly towards their duties, there was more organization and fewer breaches of military discipline.

In citing this unit as an example, I don't want to say that everyone here has learned to think and work in a new fashion. Only the very first steps have been taken. Both the commander and the political department, headed by comrade Koltunov, are well aware of this.

[Question] You said that reorganizing work in the spirit of new requirements is a process requiring organized efforts. What directions do the military council and the political directorate of the Air Defense Forces single out here?

[Answer] This work is very extensive work since it touches upon all aspects of the activities of military personnel. If we are to speak in terms of the principal directions and the principal factors able most effectively to support reorganization, I would single out two of them. The first is stepping up the activities of party organizations. The second is improving the work style of commanders, staffs and political organs. Obviously, there is no need to explain why we single out namely these two directions as the principal ones: They include both organizational work and ideological support.

Primary party organizations are the party's chief potential, where its policies are converted into real deeds. It is clear how vital a role belongs to the party organizations in completing all tasks and in pursuing the party policy for strengthening discipline, organization and responsibility. What forms of work prove to be the most effective here? As in everything, you must begin with yourself, with personal exemplariness of communists and with increasing party exactingness. The experience of the party organization of the unit (chast) in which Lt Col heads the party committee seems instructive to us in this respect. In discussing their tasks resulting from the decisions of the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum, they began with each communist determining the goals which he should achieve in the pre-congress competition. This does not involve socialist commitments made earlier and then reviewed, but qualitatively new goals with stricter evaluation criteria. The discussions were held in party groups and party organizations under conditions of high mutual exactingness of communists.

Communists are actively introducing this atmosphere of increased exactingness and strictness into the live and combat training of the entire unit collective. The change from words to deeds has been noticeable. Each person is now being held more responsible for efficiently and fully carrying out his official duties. We believe that this is quite the correct approach and that the key to success is here. Along with this, you must convince people and drive into the heart and mind of every soldier what a tremendous responsibility has been placed on us, the armed defenders of the Motherland, in today's complex and tense international situation.

Speaking of ways to increase the activeness and liveliness of the party organization as the political nucleus of a military collective, I want to emphasize that the experience of the pre-congress work reaffirms the effectiveness and efficiency of such a form as reporting by communists. Although it must be noted that this is on the condition that the reports are given under conditions of high mutual exactingness of party members and in close connections with specific tasks which a unit or subunit (chast, podrazdeleniye) are carrying out.

[Question] It was noted at the April Plenum that an important role is assigned to leaders of all ranks in the reorganization of work. Under conditions of one-man command in the army and navy, the role of the leader is

especially great. What is being done in the Air Defense Forces to ensure that officer-leaders fully carry out this role? Also, what problems are arising here?

[Answer] I already said that we see work style of leaders as one of the factors upon which the reorganization depends. One of the most important components of the Leninist work style is the readiness to bear full responsibility for the state of affairs in one's section. Much has been said in the past as well about the need to increase responsibility. But often this was limited only to talk. Today this problem is being raised in a new fashion, I would say, in a politically acute form. We are trying to shift it to a practical plane.

Recently, for example, at the military council we examined the question of one general's suitability for a position. I will not give his name--he did not do anything reprehensible. The man was given a chance to improve his methods of work. But the job for which he is responsible is not moving forward, it may be slipping backwards. In short, we decided to recommend removal from the position. Although we understand that this is an extreme measure, it cannot be otherwise. The job is suffering.

Today, increased demands are being made on the political, practical as well as moral qualities of the leader. Again, I will cite a specific example. The other day we invited to the military council communist Timokhin, whose sense of responsibility for the state of affairs in his assigned work section had decreased. Moreover, he was using his official position for mercenary motives. We thoroughly examined this and concluded that he had lost the moral right to hold a high leading post. At the same time, we recommended removing communist Redkin from his position, who not only closed his eyes to Timokhin, taking an unprincipled stand, but himself began to misuse his official position. Party proceedings have been instituted against both of them.

[Question] What do you consider to be the main thing in educating people to be responsible?

[Answer] The starting point in the struggle to foster responsibility is high exactingness of people and holding each person strictly accountable for fulfilling the duties of his position. One would think that we, being in the military, should not have to talk about increasing responsibility and intensifying exactingness and strictness. The specific nature of military service not only assumes this, but makes it incumbent upon every commander, supervisor, and any leader to do this. Nevertheless, we must talk about this.

Here is such an example. Several subunits in one anti-aircraft missile unit had demonstrated low results at live-firing exercises. There were objective reasons for this; the subunits simply proved to be poorly trained. What measures were taken against the commanders and other officials responsible for the failures in combat training? None. And what position did the political department and the party organization take here? None of the communists were held personally responsible for this. Naturally, closing your eyes to things like this cannot help foster responsibility and increase discipline and good organization.

While on the topic of work style of officer-leaders, I especially want to say one thing. It is known that the effectiveness of a commander's or supervisor's influence on subordinates depends to a considerable extent on how close he is to them and how well he knows their concerns, needs and interests--in short, everything that has to do with how they live. However, many officers do not try to get close like this. I hear some people say that the difference in military rank is sort of a barrier to sincere interaction with subordinates--they say that subordination holds them back. Such assertions are unfounded. It is not subordination that holds people back, but the inaccessibility and coldness of this supervisor. For example, soldiers are drawn to Petr Ivanovich Grigoryev in spite of his general rank. That is because they see his sincere closeness to them, his attentiveness and tactfulness. And one more thing--sincerity. But if the supervisor came into the company, checked the aligned beds and, at best, asked the orderly where he was from, of course, there is no benefit from such "closeness" to subordinates.

[Question] It also happens that an officer sees his subordinates continuously from reveille to retreat everyday, but there is no closeness, and he does not know how they live.

[Answer] Yes, that happens too. Unfortunately, all too often. I encountered just such a case not long ago while investigating a flagrant breach of military discipline. The situation was ripe for an incident for a long time. This was apparent, as they say, to the naked eye. But the subunit commander, Maj Musiyenko, and his deputy for political affairs, Capt Kryukov, did not see this. That is because they were far apart from their subordinates.

[Question] Some of our readers tell in their letters about what plans have been developed for reorganizing work and what measures have been planned, but not much is said about what is being done specifically. Apparently, there is nothing to say at this time?

[Answer] That is probably the case. We also encounter this. You see: tasks are discussed, decisions made and plans made up. But what next? It's as if they are waiting for some kind of instructions.

I would like again to remind leaders taking such a stand of the well-known words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that it is not enough to develop a correct policy, take the right course and make good decisions. The main thing is to organize their implementation and begin to act. Namely, to act. We cannot allow real, practical deeds to be buried in high-flown talk about the correctness of planned measures. It is inadmissible to linger around waiting for some kind of new directions and written instructions from above.

We are orienting on this and demand this of commanders, political organs and party organizations.

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CSO: 1801/304

ARMED FORCES

DECREE ON VIOLATION OF MILITARY REGISTRATION REGULATIONS

Moscow VEDOMOSTI VVERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK in Russian No 32 (2314) 7 Aug 85 pp 499-502

[Ukase No 582 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on Administrative Responsibility for Violation of Military Registration Regulations]

[Text] In order to increase the responsibility of citizens and officials for violation of military registration regulations, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet hereby resolves:

1. To stipulate that citizens failing to appear without good reasons when summoned to the military commissariat for induction section registration are subject administrative punishment in the form of a warning.

2. Administrators or other officials of housing operation organizations, enterprises, institutions, organizations and educational institutions and landlords responsible for military registration work are subject to a warning or a fine of 10 to 20 rubles for not submitting to military commissariats by the prescribe date lists of youths subject to induction section registration.

A repeat violation during the year, for which an administrative punishment has already been received, draws a fine of 20 to 50 rubles.

3. Administrators or other officials of enterprises, institutions, organizations, kolkhozes and educational institutions are subject to a fine of 10 to 20 rubles for hiring (enrolling) reservists and draftees not on the military register for their place of residence.

A repeat violation during the year, for which an administrative punishment has been received, draws a fine of 20 to 50 rubles.

4. Administrators or other officials of enterprises, institutions, organizations, kolkhozes and educational institutions responsible for military registration work who have not, at the request of military commissariats, notified reservists and draftees about their summons to the military commissariats or have impeded the timely appearance of citizens at assembly points or induction sections are subject to a warning or a fine of 10 to 20 rubles.

A repeat violation during the year of one of the stipulations in part one of this article, for which the individual has already received an administrative punishment, draws a fine of 20 to 50 rubles.

5. Administrators or other officials responsible for military registration work of housing operation organizations, enterprises, institutions and organizations operating houses and also landlords are subject to a warning or fine of 10 to 20 rubles for failure to timely submit to military commissariats and executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, charged with initial registration of reservists and draftees, house registers, registration cards and military registration documents (military service cards, draft registration certificates) for tenants who are reservists or draftees for entry on or removal from the military register, and also for failure to inform them about a summons to military commissariats.

A repeat violation during the year of one of the stipulations in part one of this article, for which the individual has already received an administrative punishment, draws a fine of 20 to 50 rubles.

6. Officials of medical-labor boards charged with reporting information on all reservists and draftees recognized as disabled, regardless of the classification of the disability, to military commissariats through social security divisions of executive committees of rayon, city and rayon soviets of people's deputies in cities are subject to a warning or fine of 20 to 20 rubles for failure to report such information.

Officials of agencies for recording civilian status documents are subject to a warning or fine of 10 to 20 rubles for failure to report to rayon (city) military commissariats information on name changes by reservists and draftees and changes made to civilian status documents concerning the date and place of their birth and also instances of registering the death of reservists and draftees.

A repeat violation during the year of one of the stipulations in part one or two of this article, for which the individual has already received an administrative punishment, draws a fine of 20 to 50 rubles.

7. Guilty citizens and officials bear administrative responsibility for violating military registration regulations if by their nature these violations do not entail criminal proceedings under existing legislation.

8. The record of proceedings on violations of military registration regulations specified by this Ukase is compiled by the official of the rayon (city) military commissariat authorized to do so.

9. Cases concerning violations of military registration regulations specified by Article 1 of this Ukase are considered by the rayon (city) military commissar.

Cases concerning violations of military registration regulations specified by articles 2-6 of this Ukase are considered by administrative commissions of

executive committees of rayon, city, city rayon, settlement and rural soviets of people's deputies.

10. Make the following changes to the USSR law "On General Military Service" dated 12 October 1967 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1967, No 42, Art. 552; No 52, Art. 1121):

1) In Article 21:

In part three substitute the words "certification of induction section registration" for the words "special certificate;"

Make part five read as follows:

"Housing operation organizations, enterprises, institutions and organizations operating houses, landlords and also executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, which, in accordance with Article 86 of this Law, are charged with conducting initial registration of reservists and inductees, personnel divisions of enterprises, institutions, organizations and educational institutions each year on dates established by the USSR Ministry of Defense, submit to the appropriate rayon (city) military commissariats lists of young people subject to registration at induction sections;"

2) In articles 89 and 90 substitute the words "housing operation organization, enterprise, institution and organization operating houses" and "to the executive committee" for the words "housing management (housing operation office, commandant's office)" and "to the military registration section of the executive committee" respectively;

3) Make articles 86, 91, 94, 100 and 103 read as follows:

"Article 86. Initial registration of all reservists and inductees residing in rural areas and also in cities and settlements where there are no military commissariats is entrusted to the executive committees of city, settlement and rural soviets of people's deputies."

"Article 91. Reserve officers report in person to military commissariats for inclusion on the military register. Inclusion on and removal from the register of reserve officers residing in populated areas far away from military commissariats can also be accomplished by executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies charged with conducting initial registration of reservists and inductees."

"Article 94. Reservists and inductees are subject to a warning or a fine of up to 10 rubles imposed by the rayon (city) military commissar for violating the military registration regulations prescribed by articles 89-92 and also for not appearing when summoned to the military commissariat without good reasons, for intentional damage or careless storage of military registration documents (military service cards and draft registration certificates) resulting in their loss, and for late reporting of information concerning a change of address, education, place of work and position to the registration agency where they are listed on the military register.

A repeat violation during the year of one of the stipulations of part one of this article, for which the individual has already received an administrative punishment, draws a fine of 10 to 50 rubles if by its nature this violation does not involve criminal proceeding under with existing legislation.

The military commissary informs the administrator of the enterprise, institution, organization, kolkhoz or educational institution for the place of work (study) of the reservist or inductee concerning the imposition of administrative punishment."

"Article 100. Administrators of housing operation organizations, enterprises, institutions and organizations operating houses and also landlords are obligated to submit in a timely manner to military commissariats and executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, charged with conducting initial registration of reservists and inductees, house registers, registration cards and military registration documents for residents who are reservists or inductees for entry on or removal from the military register or revising data, to see that reservists and inductees observe military registration regulations and also to notify reservists and inductees concerning a summons to military commissariats."

"Article 103. Inquiry and preliminary investigation agencies are obliged to inform rayon (city) military commissariats within 7 days concerning inductees against whom criminal proceedings have been instituted; courts must inform them about sentences which have entered into validity with regard to convicted reservists and inductees.

The military service cards of reservists and military registration certificates of inductees condemned to imprisonment, including suspended imprisonment with mandatory labor, are forwarded by the courts to the appropriate military commissariats."

11. Make the following change to the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 21 June 1961 "On Further Limitation of the Use of Fines Imposed by Administrative Order" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1961, No 35, Art. 368; 1982, No 37, Art. 698; 1983, No 9, Art. 138, No 34, Art. 522; 1984, No 24, Art. 423; 1985, No 21, Art. 369):

Make paragraph nine of part one of Article 13 read as follows:

"by organs of the USSR Ministry of Defense--for violation by reservists and inductees of military registration regulations prescribed by articles 89-92 of the USSR Law "On General Military Service," and also for not appearing when summoned to a military commissariat without good reasons, for intentional damage or careless storage of military service cards and military registration certificates resulting in their loss, and for late reporting of information concerning a change of address, education, place of work and position to the registration agency where they are listed on the military register."

Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: A. Gramyko

Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: T. Menteshashvili

Moscow, The Kremlin, 30 July 1985

No 2923-XI

12567

CSO: 1801/304

ARMED FORCES

PROCESS OF INNOVATION DELAYED BY BUREAUCRACY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 1985 p 2

[Article by V. Kamenetskiy, major, Northern Group of Forces: But What's the Result"]

[Text] At the last group meeting of inventors and rationalizers, it was noted that technical creativity in Unit N is in a state of stagnation.

This is so despite the fact that officers and ensigns, whose names have often appeared in the local press and whose inventions and names are well known in the SGV [Northern Group of Forces], serve in this unit. In short, it is not like them to rest on their laurels. What then is the reason for this?

Lieutenant Colonel A. Ponomarenko, the chairman of the invention commission, could not answer my questions and advised me to talk to the senior ensign, V. Blinkov. Blinkov, he says, knows the situation better. The very fact that someone else can comment upon the condition of affairs in technical inventions and their implementation seemed strange. What, then, is the role of the commission, this technical creativity staff; what is its organizing principle?

Subsequent inquiry revealed that the unit has inquisitive, sharp people, capable of doing much to improve the utilization and operation of military weapons and equipment. They have devised many useful improvements in their (military weapons and equipment) repair and maintenance. I have heard of interesting plans and of unused potential. But this sounded all very abstract: neither conceived concretely, nor as regards schedules for their implementation. And it is here that the main reason for the stagnation was revealed: the design planners have no clear concept of the problems, nor is there a plan acknowledged as being the organizing principle, the basis for the work of the invention commission itself and the inventor as well.

Officer Ponomarenko could not name those who comprised the staff of the commission he headed, while Blinkov, the senior ensign, was somewhat surprised to hear that he was a member of this commission. From other facts which came out, it was evident that creative work in this unit had been neglected. Information to call knowledge of innovations recommended for implementation to the innovators' attention is poorly supplied. Conferences and meetings of the inventors for the purpose of exchanging experience are almost never held in

the garrison. A once popular suggestion--(to put all information bulletins and other documentation in a special classroom) remained only a happy thought. Yu Beleko, the political officer, explained: "We have the room, but we don't have the time."

However, a classroom is not the most important thing. The inventors' creative work will be fully effective only when their ideas are realized and the innovations are implemented. But in practice, unfortunately, there are cases where the inventor's research is rendered useless, where what has been proposed never gets off the drawing board and, if it is implemented, then only as a single model. For example, Yu. Zakharov, an ensign, built a universal support for the unjoining and joining a BMP engine, but no application was made for the rationalization proposal; neighbors did not hear about the innovation; there they were philosophizing about their solution.

By the way, about what happens to applications. Three years ago Senior Ensign V. Blinkov designed and built two very useful machines: one washed tables in the messhall, the other quickly and economically peeled potatoes. In Moscow, various departments--including the one where they review inventor's proposals and the one where they deal with food procurement--approved the inventions, but . . . Alluding to the fact that the application was written incorrectly, they returned the papers to SGV headquarters. There they sat for two months (!) on Captain Plaksenko's desk, and they came back to the regiment with such difficult accompanying documentation that the author of the design remarked bitterly: "It would be easier for me to build another machine than to fill out the application paperwork".

The correspondence on these innovations has already lasted almost three years. This is quite a bit of time. But what could be simpler than to go see the appropriate official in the regiment, to personally become acquainted with the inventor, to see the machines in action and help fill out the paperwork, while at the same time investigating the causes for the increasing number of unimplemented, though adopted rationalization proposals in 1983 (in 1983--18 percent, in 1984--25 percent).

And there is still another aspect of this problem. I asked Officer A. Ponomarenko: "What level of compensation did the rationalizers receive the past year?" "I can't say for sure", was the answer. Captain A. Sobolev, the head of the finance department, cleared things up: "We didn't spend a single ruble, but there is money for incentives. Nobody wants to 'mess with' the paperwork."

I inquired in the partkom: Were the problems of technical creativity the subject of party discussion; had the party been keeping track of the inventors' work? The response was reassuring: "There is no need to worry; 50 rationalization proposals have been submitted this past year." An attempt to examine the reality behind this figure revealed that this many inventions had not been proposed even in the past ten years.

Perhaps the innovator's work is not needed in the regiment? Perhaps here the teaching and material resources are the most modern? There are no grounds for

such optimism. Also the demands on training quality are growing every year; programs are becoming more complex. Rationalizers have places to apply their knowledge and abilities. We need combined trainers and programed learning classrooms which eliminate simplification and conventionality. We need automatized systems for checking and self-checking of the students' knowledge. We need visual aids which will make it possible to assimilate the working principle of complex machinery quickly. This is all available in progressive collectives, but here in this unit many skilled craftsmen labor in solitude. There is still much amateurish work as well.

They spoke positively about the N training department (Lieutenant-Colonel M. Zubkov, commission chairman) at the conference. But this did not hold up to closer examination. When we went to inspect the teaching and material resources, the "front-rank people" had nothing to boast about. Even the things they showed us, generally speaking, were not innovative, nor an improvement, but simply a mimicking of well-known diagrams and models. In short, ordinary, mediocre work received praise.

There are unutilized reserves in both departments. Not inconsiderable reserves. However, the lack of interest in technical innovation and the deterioration in business-like efficiency sometimes prevent them from being completely utilized. Creative people labor here gropingly, and this is the reason for the slow progress of KPD creativity.

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CSO: 1801/240

ARMED FORCES

REPUBLIC MEETING OF FUTURE OFFICERS

Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 17 Jul 85 p 2

[Article: "Gathering of Future Officers"]

[Text] Yesterday there was a republic gathering of youth accepted into military schools of our country at the Tashkent Railroad Workers' Palace of Culture.

...The preparation for study, acquisition of skills for military professions in the Zarnitsa and Orlyonok Sport Games, troubles and excitement are all behind them. Now the youths are very happily seated in the auditorium. Parents who raised them, Komsomol organizations representatives, veterans of war and labor, and officers were also invited to the gathering.

Republic Military Commissar O. R. Mominov opened the gathering with a short opening remark. Uzbekistan Komsomol Central Committee Secretary O. J. Ismoilov congratulated the youths and wished them success in their studies.

"We have no doubt that you will justify our faith," said S. Bozorova speaking in the name of the mothers. "Do not forget your mothers...."

Retired Major General V. I. Ul'yanov called on the youths to become brave and loyal defenders of the homeland which the older generation saved through millions of sacrifices.

It was noted with pride by those who spoke that ever more local [milliy] young people in our republic are expressing the desire to enter military schools.

Indeed it is so. This year hundreds of youths like A'zam Valiyev and Maqsud Abirov of Tashkent, Ghayrat Jumaniyozov of Khorezm, Sharif Ahmedov of Chirchik, Nuriddin Bayirov of Angren, and Ravshan Nazyrov of Andizhan successfully passed the exams and have been accepted into military schools.

The gathering ends. The youths are excited. Ahead are interesting and responsible training: on land, in the sky, on and under the sea. Our fellow countrymen must strive to be worthy of the faith of the Komsomol organizations which have given them directions, and of their parents who are seeing them off with hope. Uzbekistan Communist Party CC Sector Chairman V. A. Postovalov participated in the work of the gathering.

ARMED FORCES

INTERVIEWS WITH U2SSR CADETS AT TASHKENT MILITARY SCHOOL

[Editorial Report] Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 18 July 1985 carries on page 2 a 1,000 word article by N. Bal'shem (Colonel) titled "Faith Leads Forward." The article consists of interviews with 6 cadets from Uzbekistan who are studying at the Tashkent General Forces Commanders' School. In the beginning of the article some of the cadets discuss the reasons for their career choice. Next they discuss how they learned Russian in secondary school during Russian language classes and primary military preparedness lessons. Those interviewed also discuss what they find easiest and most difficult in their studies, and their parents' attitudes toward the career choice of officer. Several cadets reveal that their parents did not immediately accept the idea of their sons becoming officers. In conclusion, Bal'shem adds, "I advise young friends who desire to become officers to enthusiastically study primary military preparedness lessons and the Russian language."

MOTHER GLADDENED BY LETTERS FROM SON IN ARMY

[Editorial Report] Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 3 July 1985 carries on p 4 a 1,100 word article by San'at Makhmudova (soldier's mother) titled "How Are Our Fellow Countrymen Serving: My Son the Soldier." The article is written by the mother of soldier Sarvar who left for service slightly over a year ago. The mother begins her article by recalling the farewell of the new recruits and a letter from another soldier (to his own mother) about difficulties experienced in the army. As the letters from Makhmudova's son which are cited in the article reveal, Sarvar is not having such a hard time. One letter is written from the "beautiful Ukraine," which was much to Sarvar's liking. Many of the comments in Sarvar's letters home are addressed to his brothers. He advises them to study and work hard and to take part in sports. Otherwise, "I am writing you frankly, you will have a hard time." He also encourages them to read more books in Russian. "There are Ukrainian, Kzakh, Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Estonian fellows here, and they all speak in Russian. Yes, if you know Russian well, you'll be like their brother."

OPERATION OF MILITARY SCHOOLS MANDATE COMMISSIONS DESCRIBED

[Editorial Report] Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 13 July 1985 carries on pages 1-2 an article by S. Ostonov titled "For the Defense of the Homeland:

Report From the Mandate Commission's Meeting." The article begins by describing the meeting of the mandate commission which approves the admission of secondary school graduate Orif Inomov to Leningrad Academy of Military Medicine imeni Kirov. It is reported that Inomov had a total of 19 points on entrance exams. The chairman in charge of the mandate commission was Uzbekistan Military Commissar U. Mominov.

The article tells that when Inomov was in the 8th grade he told his Russian language teacher that he wanted to enter a military school and asked what he should do to learn Russian better. The teacher gave him individual help with Russian and told him to read more artistic literature. Ostonov reports that members of the mandate commission appeared even more excited than the school graduates. "Here it is necessary to express a thought. Of course no parents wish bad things for their children. But some parents try to send their children to the school they [the parents] want without consideration for the wishes or ability of their children. And in accordance with their parents' wishes the children enter faculties which they are not well informed about and which they do not like. This can be detected during the mandate commission. When studies begin, such youths have a hard time or else the desire to enter another faculty or school never leaves them in peace." "It is necessary for parents to have profound discussions with their children who are going to become military [officers] and to interfere as little as possible with their decision to enter the military school of their choice."

PATROITIC TRAINING IN SCHOOLS OF UZBEKISTAN

[Editorial Report] Tashkent SOVET MAK TABI in Uzbek No 6, February 1985 carries on pages 3-8 a 2,100-word unsigned editorial titled "Let's Raise Young People in the Spirit of Ardent Love of the Motherland." The article discusses the importance of patriotic upbringing and its practice in the schools of Uzbekistan. It is said that "Preparation of pupils for service in the Armed Forces of the USSR, raising them in a spirit of love for the Soviet Army, and forming in them great pride that they are living in the socialist homeland and the feeling of constant readiness to defend the homeland must be the basis of upbringing in a spirit of military patriotism." The editorial notes how such school subjects as literature, social studies, history, Fundamentals of Soviet State and Law, and geography are important in this regard. Unfortunately, some teachers do not go beyond the textbooks, do not fully utilize belles lettres, and do not refer to real life events. "This is harmful to raising pupils as ardent patriots." The editorial states that today all schools in the republic have "modern military cabinets." Seven hundred eight-three museums of military fame and 3,690 shooting ranges have been established, along with corners and halls of fame in all schools, exhibits praising World War II heroes, gymnastic "villages" adapted for military sport exercises, and 1,542 obstacle courses. Five thousand five hundred sixty teachers of primary military preparedness are enthusiastically teaching young people the secrets of military training, and to love and defend their homeland. The editorial cites positive experience in a number of cities of the republic. Among the few weak points mentioned is the following, "When youths are being dispatched to the Soviet Army, some parents protect their sons and try to keep them from being sent. They try to rely on ties of personal friendship and obtain false statements of illness. But the military commissariat strikes at these swindlers in timely fashion. It is apparent that such shortcomings are the result of a weakening of our upbringing work. The time has come to put an end to such discrepancies."

DOSAAF

SECOND QUARTER, 1985: COMPETITION RESULTS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 11 Aug 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Winners Have Been Determined"]

[Text] The results of the All-Union Socialist Competition of DOSAAF Production Enterprises for the second quarter and the first 6 months of 1985 have been summed up. The overwhelming majority of labor collectives successfully fulfilled the established quotas and socialist commitments made.

Leading collectives of DOSAAF enterprises and production associations are working with creative enthusiasm on further fulfillment of the quotas of the year and the five-year plan, putting into practice the patriotic mottoes "Honor and Glory in Labor," "A High-Speed Finish for the Five-Year Plan" and "A Fitting Welcome to the 27th CPSU Congress."

More than 4,100 people are participating in the movement for a communist attitude towards labor. The honorary title of "Shock Worker of Communist Labor" has been awarded to 2,800 workers, engineering and technical personnel and office workers. The title of "Collective of Communist Labor" has been given to 70 brigade, section and divisions collectives, and 260 leading production workers have been awarded the badge "Shock Worker of the 11th Five-Year Plan."

Work continues at DOSAAF enterprises on changing over to the new form of organization of labor with pay according to the end results. The number of brigades using the labor participation coefficient (KTU) increased to 200, compared to 180 the previous quarter.

Participating in the All-Union Public Review of the Effectiveness of Using Raw Materials, Materials and Fuel and Energy Resources, in the second quarter of 1985 the collectives saved 5.5 tons of ferrous and non-ferrous metal and 271,800 kWh of electricity. In all, raw-material and fuel and energy resources amounting to 67,300 rubles were saved.

The social and political activeness of the labor collectives has increased in making demands of workers committing violations of labor and social discipline and consuming alcoholic beverages.

At most enterprises this year they are successfully fulfilling the comprehensive plans outlined for the 11th Five-Year Plan for improving working conditions, labor safety procedures and sanitation measures.

In the course of socialist competition for a fitting welcome to the 27th CPSU Congress, the 40th anniversary of the Victory and the 50th anniversary of the Stakhanov movement, collectives of the enterprises fulfilled the plan for production output 102.1 percent for the second quarter of 1985. The entire increase in production volume was achieved by increasing labor productivity.

The quota for labor productivity growth for the second quarter of 1985 was fulfilled 105.2 percent, and 105.2 percent for the 6 months. Compared to the corresponding period last year, the increase in labor productivity was 5.8 percent.

The growth rate of labor productivity is leading the rate of increase of the average wage by 4.4 percent.

The plan for labor productivity, taking into account the socialist commitments made, was fulfilled 102.1 percent.

During the first 6 months a reduction of 1.4 percent in the cost of commodity production was achieved, 0.8 percent taking into account the socialist commitments made, and an additional profit of more than 1 million rubles was obtained.

Having jointly examined the materials on the results of the All-Union Socialist Competition for the second quarter of 1985, the bureau of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and the Central Committee Presidium of the Trade Union of Culture Workers decided to award first place and present the challenge Red Banner of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Culture Workers and first place prize money to the collective of the Moscow DOSAAF Aviation Repair Plant (plant chief G. Zarets-Ignatov, party organization secretary V. Vodyanitskiy, chairman of the trade union committee V. Chadin and secretary of the Komsomol organization S. Riskin).

Second place went to collectives of the production combine of the Rostov DOSAAF Obkom and the Sputnik Production Association of the Latvian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

In third place are collectives of the production combine of the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the production combine of Azerbaijan SSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the Donetsk DOSAAF Production Combine.

Also noted for good work were collectives of the Izdatelstvo DOSAAF Printing House, DOSAAF Plant No 9 (in Kiev), the Vikhur Experimental Sports Equipment Plant of the Estonian SSR and the production association of the Moscow DOSAAF Obkom.

It was suggested to the managers of the production enterprises of the Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkov combines, the Kropotkin DOSAAF Plant and the Gomel DOSAAF Sports Modelling and Training Aids Plant, and production combines of the Omsk and Volgograd DOSAAF obkoms not fulfilling the plan for the basic technical and economic indicators to analyze the reasons for the shortcomings and to develop and implement measures to eliminate them.

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CSO: 1801/304

DOSAAF

REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HOLDING REPORTING-ELECTORAL MEETINGS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 11 Aug 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The Reporting-Electoral Meeting of a Primary Organization"]

[Text] In connection with the forthcoming reports and elections in DOSAAF organizations, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the SOVETSKIY PATRIOT editorial staff are receiving letters from workers and activists of the society requesting an explanation of certain statutes dealing with conducting election campaigns.

We are fulfilling their request.

Reports and elections in primary DOSAAF organizations are held in October-November 1985. They will be held in conditions of active preparation for the 27th CPSU Congress.

What is the sequence of preparing for reports and elections.

Reporting-electoral meetings in primary DOSAAF organizations must be preceded by meetings in shop, brigade and their equivalent organizations.

The chairman of the DOSAAF committee makes up a schedule of shop meetings taking into account specific conditions, reports this to his party committee (bureau); it is then approved at a session of the DOSAAF committee. Committee members and the aktiv are assigned to shop organizations to help in preparing and conducting the meetings.

After all shop and equivalent meetings are concluded, a reporting-electoral meeting (conference) of the primary organization is convened. According to the regulations of the society, conferences can be conducted in primary organizations having more than 200 DOSAAF members. Delegates to the conference are elected by a show of hands at meetings of shop, brigade and equivalent DOSAAF collectives. The number of delegates to be elected to the conference is established by the committee, and the representation norm must be the same for all shop organizations.

A meeting (conference) is considered competent if more than one-half of the DOSAAF members or elected delegates are present.

What items are included on the agenda of the reporting-electoral meeting (conference).

The following items are included on the agenda of the reporting-electoral meeting (conference):

1. The report of the committee (the chairman when there is no committee).
2. The report of the auditing commission (auditor).
3. Election of the committee (where there is no committee--elections of the primary organization chairman, deputy chairman and treasurer).
4. Election of the auditing commission (auditor).
5. Election of delegates to the rayon (city) conference.

Additionally, an item may be included on adopting socialist commitments for the coming year.

The committee, auditing commission and delegates to the rayon (city) conference are elected by a show of hands.

What is involved in preparatory work for the reporting-electoral meeting (conference).

The committee (chairman) of the primary organization is responsible for preparing the meeting (conference).

One should determine beforehand the date, time and place for holding the meeting. Members of the society must be informed of this no later than 5 days before the meeting. The reporting-electoral meeting (conference) should not be combined with meetings of other organizations or any other measures.

The committee compiles a plan for organizational support of the meeting (conference). It stipulates the distribution of duties among committee members and the aktiv and indicates who prepares which sections of the report and who is responsible for preparing the draft resolution; it specifies those responsible for notification of the meeting, ensuring attendance of DOSAAF members at the meeting, setting up the room in which it will be held and the procedure for registering delegates. Dates are established for the committee session to discuss and approve the report.

What items need to be included in the report.

In the report it is necessary to analyze deeply and comprehensively the primary organization's work on carrying out the tasks resulting from the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and subsequent plenums and the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee, the salutatory address of the CPSU

Central Committee to the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress and the decisions of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee congress and plenums.

What the committee has done in the way of organizational strengthening of the primary organization and transforming it into an efficient and active collective--a genuine center of mass defensive work.

Use specific examples to show the organization's participation in military patriotic education of working people and youth and its effectiveness; how members of the society master military technical knowledge and acquire military technical specialties; what the effect has been on strengthening labor discipline and increasing labor productivity. What was done for the 40th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Tell what has been done to train young people for service in the USSR Armed Forces. How draftees training in DOSAAF schools and at initial military training points master military technical specialties and military knowledge. How the primary organization participates in training personnel for the national economy and how military technical propaganda is conducted among the workers.

What has been done to get DOSAAF members widely involved in activities with technical and military-related types of sports. What measures have been taken to establish with the organization's own resources the simplest sports facilities and to equip training classrooms, workshops and so forth. How the sports-technical club is working.

It is necessary to examine the specific participation of DOSAAF members and shop organizations in socialist competition and fulfillment by the defense collective of the commitments made. With what indicators is it welcoming the 27th CPSU Congress.

Show how members of the committee discharged the powers entrusted to them, their responsibility for assigned work, how the requirements of DOSAAF regulations are being fulfilled in the collective, and how the drive is going to fulfill the adopted plans and decisions.

Tell about the joint work with trade-union, Komsomol and other public organizations and what help has been given to DOSAAF organizations of supported kolkhozes, schools and vocational and technical schools.

The report is approved at the session of the DOSAAF committee.

The efficiency of the meeting is largely determined by the content of the report. It must not contain praises and compliments or try to cover up the actual state of affairs with generalities. The report must be aimed at contributing to a free exchange of opinions, fundamental criticism and self-criticism.

How to prepare the draft decision of the meeting (conference).

In order for the draft decision to be interesting and specific, it is advisable to prepare its basis beforehand and add to it during the addresses of the meeting (conference) participants, taking into account the proposals and remarks made by them.

The decision consists of two parts: the statement and resolution. The first part briefly outlines what has been done by the committee (chairman) during the reporting period and notes the shortcomings, pointing out their causes.

The first paragraph of the resolution includes an evaluation of the committee's (chairman's) activities during the reporting period which is made by the meeting participants before reading of the first paragraph based on proposals of the speakers.

Subsequent paragraphs point out specific measures which the committee is to carry out and specify the deadlines for their execution and the individuals responsible for them.

The substance of the measures must be directed towards a fitting welcome to the 27th CPSU Congress, fulfillment of the decisions of the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress and requirements of the regulations, further increasing the level of mass-defense and military-patriotic work, improving training of young people for service in the USSR Armed Forces and personnel for the national economy, improving military-technical propaganda, developing technical and military-related types of sports and establishing and consolidating the material-technical base.

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CSO: 1801/304

DOSAAF

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS WEAKNESSES OF SOCIETY'S TECHNICAL TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Kh. Mambetov, chief of staff of 'N' missile unit, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District: "Behind the Satisfactory Marks: Poor Training of Specialists in Certain DOSAAF Schools Results in Economic and Other Losses"]

[Text] Recently in the unit (chast) we were training young drivers for executing a march. Suddenly when checking their skills it was discovered that Pvt A. Vorobyev had never sat behind the wheel of a motor vehicle before coming into the service. Initially, it was thought that this was some kind of a mistake--you see, something like this simply could not be. It turned out, however, that there was no mistake. Vorobyev, as it appeared in his documents, successfully graduated from the Velikolukskiy DOSAAF Combined Technical School and had been issued a beginner's license for driving a motor vehicle.

Vorobyev's case could be considered a curious exception to the rule if he had been the only one like this. From experience we know that if training organization graduates arrive at the unit from Arkhangelsk Oblast, especially from the Severodvinsk DOSAAF Motor Vehicle School, there is usually quite a bit of trouble with them. That is because they have a poor knowledge of rules of the road, have minimum skills in driving and are unable to correct the simplest malfunctions. The latest call-up of young drivers from Arkhangelsk Oblast is notable for poor professional training. We were forced even to suspend Pvt A. Tretyakov (Nyandoma DOSAAF Motor Vehicle School) from driving a vehicle for health reasons. He once received a head injury, but neither the instructors of the school nor the workers of the military commissariat took this fact into account.

Of course, most of the training organizations of the defense society which send graduates to our unit train fairly good specialists in a professional respect. As an example, the DOSAAF motor vehicle schools of Lithuania are such. But now it is a question of miscalculations and moral and economic losses, which are the result of low-quality training of specialists in a number of schools, and not just motor vehicle schools.

Recently, Pvt T. Podolskiy, a graduate of the Vilnius DOSAAF Electronics School, arrived at our unit. According to his documents, he was an operator. We talked with him and found out that his knowledge of the most elementary information about equipment and primary operating skills were such that we could not let him get near a radio. This is to say nothing about his knowledge of the field of pulse technology and radar--Podolskiy simply had none. You see, he received an assignment not to a training subunit where they train junior specialists, but directly to the unit.

Who would fill the vacancy? You do not train an operator in a week, or even in a month. Moreover, Podolskiy was not the only one of his kind. Graduates from the Murmask DOSAAF Combined Technical School, Pvt A. Gavrilenko and Pvt Yu. Paratuy, were not a bit better than Podolskiy in a professional respect.

Needless to say, we are finding a solution--the combat readiness of the unit cannot suffer. We are filling the vacancies with soldier possessing related specialties. We are assigning the school graduates to less responsible positions or--what else--are retraining them, starting all over practically.

How does this happen? A draftee trains for several months in a training organization, often giving up work. Considerable resources are spent on his training, and during this period the national economy loses hundreds and thousands of hands. Then the unit is forced to retrain that same draftee, now a soldier, and again expend efforts and considerable material resources. By the way, who has been calculating what these expenditures cost the state? Who is to make up for them?

These are questions for which there are no answers yet. But there must be answers--specific and concrete. Obviously, they must be given, above all, by those who are responsible for training specialists for the Armed Forces.

During my many years of service I do not remember a case where we received an inquiry from a training organization about how well trained their graduates were or how they were serving. I specially asked officers of other units--they also do not remember receiving any. It seems that our comrades are not interested. Apparently, their main goal is to graduate specialists. But what kind of a specialist he is, what he can actually do and what use he is--let them sort that out in the units.

Of course, we are to blame a little too. Here we complain when we identify weak and sometimes unfit specialists among the next call-up of DOSAAF school graduates. But all we do is complain and begin to rectify the unfinished work of others. We do not always consider it necessary to inform even the training organization about obvious defects in their work. By our silence we are unwillingly showing indulgence towards these defects. But we really must sound the alarms and not make it easy for those schools that do not regard the job entrusted to them with proper responsibility.

I admit that there may be quite a number of problems and objective reasons influencing the quality of specialist training in training organizations. But the primary one, in my opinion, is poor relations with the troops, the lack of information about the actual results of their labor.

By what criteria is the finished product of the defense society's training organizations evaluated? One gets the impression that it is by the marks which the students get on the final examinations. But in the units we sometimes come across cases where the students have quite satisfactory marks in their records, but in fact it turns out that they do not mean very much. There must be, one should think, only one criterion--the graduate's real training for working on combat equipment directly in the units. Such omissions cost the state too much.

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CSO: 1801/304

DOSAAF

WORK OF AZERBAIJANI DOSAAF REVIEWED

Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 2 Jun 85 p 2

[Azer inform report: "Prepare a Reliable Reserve for the Army"]

[Text] At the meeting of the republic's aktive society in Baku, the problems of the Azerbaydzhan DOSAAF arising from the decrees of the April (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU were discussed.

P.E. Mekhtiyev, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaydzhan Communist Party, opened the meeting.

Air Force Colonel General S. I. Kharlamov, the deputy secretary of the Central Committee of the DOSAAF, gave the report.

In recent years, it was noted at the meeting, the numerical strength of our society has increased, and an upsurge of mass-defense work and military-patriotic training has become evident.

Today, the society's republic organizations number 2,750,000 members. Local society organizations are active in almost all the labor collectives and educational institutions. Many of these organizations combine military-patriotic training with actual military training for young people.

One draftee in three undergoes training at a DOSAAF school, where he acquires competence in one of the military-technical specialities. These draftees are prepared to become specialists in the mass-technical professions. Only last year more than 25,000 drivers, tractor and bulldozer operators, who received their training at the DOSAAF schools, entered the economy.

The social organizations actively promote the further development of the military-technical aspects of sports. New automobile race tracks, driving schools, and other sports-related construction are under the direction of the DOSAAF people.

At the meeting the work methods of the Baku, Kirovabad, Sabirabad and Dzhalilabad organizations of the society, as well as the Bakinskiy naval

school, the Nakhichevan driving school, and the sport-technical club of the region imeni the 26 Bakinskiy Commissars of the city of Baku, received high marks.

At the same time, noted those who addressed the meeting, the work level of the republic's DOSAAF organization has still not completely met requirements. The local organizations of the society have still not become real centers of mass-defense work and military-patriotic training. The training of draftees often does not meet the demands of the army. The material-technical base of society and the level of development of the applied military types of sports lag behind the modern needs of young peoples.

Fleet Admiral G.M. Yegorov, the chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF, addressed the meeting.

The editorial staff of the newspapers KOMMUNIST and BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, a number of municipal newspapers, local organizations and society aktiv received Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF awards for contributing to the military-patriotic training of the workers.

C.M. Guseynov, the head of the department of administrative agencies of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, participated in the work of the conference.

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CSO: 1801/240

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

SOVIETS ASSERT HIGHER LEVEL OF PERSHING II DEPLOYMENT PLANNED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 85 p 5

[Article by V. Chernyshev: "Deception Again"]

[Text] A headquarters spokesman for the American forces based in Europe has denied the report that more American medium range nuclear missiles than stipulated by the December 1979 NATO decree will be based on the soil of the FRG. Let us recall that, in accordance with this decree, the number of Pershing-2 launchers to be based in the Federal Republic was to total 108 units. However, the West German magazine Stern, citing a secret American document, writes that Washington really intends to base not 108, but 258 launchers of this first-strike missile in the FRG.

After the denial, many Western observers would obviously have wanted quietly to place the Stern article in the "unsubstantiated report" file. But stop--not yet. Let us recall that R. Perle, the United States Undersecretary of Defense, once announced quiet unambiguously in an interview with the same magazine that the United States considers itself right (note--"considers itself right") in deploying in Western Europe more missiles than the NATO decree stipulated. Thus, through Perle Washington has announced the intention of making a most important military "decision," which threatens the security of Western Europe, in disregard of the opinions of the Europeans themselves. This, by the way, was confirmed in practice by R. Reagan, the president of the United States himself, who on 23 March 1983 announced his "Star Wars" program, not only without consulting his allies, but without even notifying them in advance.

Other instances also come to mind of when some report or other about the dangerous schemes or actions of the American militarists, hastily denied by official representatives of the United States, were subsequently confirmed by the facts.

Let us take just the latest example. Early this year the world press reported that special U.S. sub-units based in the FRG are armed with portable ("man-pack") nuclear mines for use deep in enemy territory. At first the government of the FRG categorically refused to give any explanations on this matter, while the commander of the American garrison in Bad-Teltse (Bavaria) where American special forces--the so-called "Green Berets"--undergo training,

declared with a look of outraged innocence that the report was groundless; he did not know anything about such weapons. Facts later came out confirming the deployment of this lethal weapon, not only in Bad-Teltse, but also elsewhere, in particular near Munster (Northern Rhine-Westphalia) in the depots of the U.S. 570th Artillery Division. And, finally, L. Ruhl, the FRG defense minister, was forced in a television interview to confirm the presence on West German soil of American portable nuclear mines.

In this regard, the West German bulletin, Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedinst, noted correctly: "The government has often attempted to conceal from the public concrete facts connected with turning the country's territory into an American nuclear hostage".

Attempting to conceal somehow the unsightly fact of deception and to back out of the unseemly affair, the spokesman for the government of the FRG tried to reassure the alarmed and concerned public: well, so what, let's say that there are in reality nuclear mines on West German soil; there is no cause for alarm; after all, the U.S. in deploying nuclear weapons on foreign territory observes the "maximal and extremely necessary precautionary measures." However, here again the government spokesman put his foot in it. One wants to ask him: did not these "precautionary measures" lead to a major accident involving a Pershing-2 missile on 11 January of this year near the West German city of Heilbronn; an accident which caused death and serious injury.

As regards the disinformation of public opinion in those countries where American weapons are being deployed, the DPA agency reported that in Bonn's opinion: "Washington is not obligated to provide information about national weapons systems." And Sudhoff, the spokesman for the FRG government openly announced that "the question of the supplying of American military forces remains primarily an American affair." So, citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany, don't worry. In Washington, they are deciding without you (of course, so as not to trouble you) what lethal types of weapons--missiles, mines, explosives--to place in your backyard and in quantities that suit the United States.

12701/13104
CSO: 1801/240

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

'BRIGHT STAR-85' EXERCISE SAID TO THREATEN REGION'S SECURITY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 85 p 5

[Article by V. Vinogradov: "Militarist Demonstration"]

[Text] Paris, 2 Aug (TASS)--U.S. Forces with participation of the Somali Army are conducting a military exercise in the Somali territory within the framework of maneuvers under the code name "Bright Star-85."

Commentator's Opinion

This most recent demonstration of military power conducted by the United States in the African Horn can be seen in no other way than as a serious threat to the sovereignty and security of the region's countries. Actually, the exercises which have begun in Somali territory are to last until 11 August and include the participation of American units from the Rapid Deployment Force under the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The CENTCOM Commander himself, Gen R. Kingston, has come to observe the progress of these militarist games.

These maneuvers are taking place not just in Somali territory. The foreign press reports that in the last few days special security measures have been put in place in the port of Alexandria. U.S. Navy transport-assault craft have arrived there one after the other. They delivered tanks, self-propelled guns and other types of weapons and military equipment. Then the Pentagon threw in several thousand military servicemen by air from U.S. territory. All of these militarist preparations are also connected with the "Bright Star-85" maneuvers.

The scale of this demonstration of military force may be judged by the fact that in "Bright Star-85," 9000 military servicemen and a great quantity of military equipment will be used. (Remember that in the "Bright Star 81" maneuvers 5,500 took part, and in "Bright Star-83" altogether 1,100 U.S. Army officers and men participated.) During the maneuvers which have already begun, the Pentagon intends to develop actions for U.S. Navy ships in the Mediterranean for combat assaults both from the sea and the air and bombing raids against ground targets.

The clear, offensive direction of the maneuvers organized by the Pentagon and the participation of units from the Rapid Deployment Force, which is intended for intervention, say a great deal. Firstly, that Washington, as emphasized by the Syrian paper TISHRIN, primarily operates on an aggressive course calculated to achieve their hegemonic aims in the Near East and in the Indian Ocean Basin with the help of military blackmail.

These goals are known: Attempts to force Arab and African states to subordinate themselves to American diktats and to achieve a strengthening in the position of pro-American forces in the region. In connection with this, they give attention to the reports that in the "Bright Star-85" maneuvers large contingents of armed forces from Washington's satellite countries located in the region are participating.

We cannot forget here that it was in the process of a similar American military exercise in Somalia in December 1982 that the Pentagon conducted tests in "African conditions" of their latest combat equipment including the F-15 fighter interceptors and the AWACS aircraft systems and verified the readiness of the Rapid Deployment Force for punitive operations in the African Horn region. And in August 1983 within the framework of the "Bright Star-83" maneuvers, the U.S. conducted large-scale naval exercises including an amphibious assault in the area of the Somali port of Berber. Organizing one militarist demonstration after another, Washington under the guise of conducting military maneuvers, faces no objection to stationing its forces in this important strategic region continuously. There is a basis for this proposition. The Kuwaiti agency, KUNA, reported that the U.S. has asked Cairo to agree to leaving American troops in Egyptian territory after the conclusion of "Bright Star-85." In this case, one cannot forget that at the present time off the Lebanese shores is a powerful U.S. Naval grouping headed by the nuclear aircraft carrier "Nimitz" with about 90 aircraft onboard.

However, the ominous saber rattling being done by Washington does not frighten the people. They are fully prepared to repulse the dangerous U.S. claims.

12747
CSO: 1801/298

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

VIOLATION OF LOCAL LAWS BY NATO MANEUVERS CHARGED

PM231353 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 85 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Captain Third Rank S. Makhov: "Chief Caliber of Provocations"]

[Text] The Baltops-85 maneuvers for NATO naval forces--unprecedented in terms of their scale and provocative thrust--lasted 2 weeks in the Baltic. Up to 40 warships and auxiliary vessels, antisubmarine and attack aircraft, and long-range radar detection aircraft of the AWACS system from the United States, Britain, the FRG, Denmark, and the Netherlands participated in them.

A particularly sinister nature was imparted to the maneuvers by the participation in them of a strike grouping of American ships with nuclear weapons on board. There was, above all, the battleship "Iowa", equipped with Tomahawk nuclear Cruise missiles, the latest missile cruiser "Ticonderoga", also with Tomahawks, and other ships.

In violation of Swedish laws, so the press reports, the battleship "Iowa" sailed through that country's territorial waters without prior notification. At the same time, another very important law, which prohibits the presence of any warship with nuclear weapons on board in Swedish waters, was violated. The principles of the antinuclear policy of other countries whose ports the American ships visited were violated.

As the Western press points out, actions by heterogeneous forces aimed at achieving supremacy in the Baltic and in the Straits zone were rehearsed on the exercises. The exercises culminated in artillery firing by big guns of the battleship "Iowa" in the region of Bornholm Island. It is the same battleship whose service record includes the shelling of defenseless North Korean cities, a show of force off the coasts of independent Nicaragua, and other provocative actions. And it was evidently no coincidence that the chief NATO "hawk"--American General Rogers, supreme commander in chief, NATO Allied Armed Forces, Europe--flew on board the "Iowa" in time for the chief phase of the exercises.

In this connection, the question suggests itself: Why did the Pentagon undertake this provocative show of military force?

There is no doubt that it reflects the desire of influential U.S. military-political circles to increase international tension, justify their far-reaching military preparations against this background, and draw their NATO vassals still more deeply into militarist activity. Washington is seeking to give an object lesson in the fact that, pursuing its imperial interests, it does not intend to take account of the European countries' will--not even on such an important issue as turning northern Europe into a zone free from nuclear weapons--and to accustom the Scandinavian countries to seeing American ships with nuclear weapons on board cruising in nearby waters.

The Western press points out that tasks stemming from the NATO concept of "forward boundaries" were also rehearsed during the maneuvers with regard to Baltic conditions. American Vice Admiral Mustin, commander of the NATO strike fleet, explained not so long ago what this means. "The task dictated by the bloc's naval strategy," he emphasized, "is to move forces up to forward boundaries and, if necessary, conduct combat operations on enemy territory, that is, on the territory of Warsaw Pact countries."

As we see it, the Baltic maneuvers involving large American ships with nuclear weapons on board are nothing but a dangerous militarist rehearsal. The chief caliber of American-NATO provocations is directed against peace and tranquility in Europe.

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CSO: 1801/35

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA CRITICIZES NATO 'OCEAN SAFARI' MANEUVERS

PM271601 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Sep 85 Second Edition p 3

["Military-political commentary" by Colonel A. Menshakov and Colonel O. Yuryev:
"Dangerous Games, Playing with Fire"]

[Text] Fall, as everyone knows, is the NATO strategists' favorite time for holding all sorts of military "games" in Western Europe. Furthermore, the "players" ambitions are growing year by year and the scale of the "games" is acquiring an increasingly dangerous character. This is borne out by the Ocean Safari-85 naval maneuvers which finished recently.

They were the largest maneuvers in NATO history by the bloc's allied naval forces in the Atlantic. Around 160 warships and auxiliary vessels from 10 NATO countries were brought together in a single armada. They included the U.S. aircraft carriers "Dwight D. Eisenhower," "Saratoga," and "America," and the battleship "Iowa," the British antisubmarine aircraft carrier "Illustrious," and others. Over 400 warplanes took part in the maneuvers.

The provocative character of the latest NATO "games" is demonstrated by the scenarios rehearsed during them. As the Western press points out, a NATO task force was created in the northeast Atlantic which rehearsed aggressive combat actions. The main aim was to "destroy the Soviet Navy." In the Norwegian sea carrier-borne ground-attack planes and shipborne missile squadrons "delivered" nuclear strikes against the territory of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries.

The Forces' actions in the maneuvers clearly showed the practical implementation of the concept of "forward-based positions" and a single-mindedness in the matter of "defending" military and economic communications lines in the Atlantic, which will be used in wartime to reinforce the NATO forces' offensive potential in Europe. The evidence of a U.S. journalist is highly indicative in this respect. That journalist, aboard the battleship "Iowa," came to the conclusion that a "scenario for World War II was being acted out during the maneuvers."

The aggressive nature of NATO's latest "show of strength" is evident. Nevertheless, NATO headquarters tries to pretend that there was nothing dangerous about Ocean Safari-85. They were the same kind of maneuvers as all the rest, it is claimed. Furthermore, Vice Admiral (Mastin), commander of the NATO task force

in the Atlantic, made a statement which he expressed the general wish that the Soviet Union should not regard these maneuvers as a provocation. Perhaps the vice admiral would like the Soviet Union to view the rehearsal of scenarios envisaging the destruction of the Soviet fleet and the fact that the location of NATO maneuvers is constantly brought closer to Soviet borders as "friendly actions" which help to strengthen confidence?

By the way, it is particularly strange to hear such "requests" from Vice Adm (Mastin) of all people. On the eve of Ocean Safari-85 he characterized NATO's actions like this: "We cannot be satisfied with defensive operations alone. The task dictated by the bloc's naval strategy is to advance forces to forward-based positions and, when necessary, wage combat operations on enemy territory, in other words, on the territory of Warsaw Pact countries." Comment, as they say, is superfluous.

Attention should also be drawn to the following aspect. When the maneuvers were over, the NATO ships headed toward Norwegian ports. A detachment of British ships were already in Bergen, next came a visit to Oslo by the battleship "Iowa," followed in turn by other ships. It is no secret that many of those ships carry nuclear weapons. The battleship "Iowa" in particular was among the first U.S. Navy ships to be equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles.

In this context it is natural to ask how these visits accord with Norway's "nuclear policy," whose declared principles do not envisage the presence of nuclear weapons in the country in peace time--a policy which the country's present government declares it is continuing. It is patently obvious that it is only being observed in words. In fact Norway's government, acting contrary to national interests, is showing an increasing readiness to follow Washington's aggressive course and is unreservedly allowing Norwegian territory to be used for extensive NATO militarist preparations, including visits by NATO ships carrying nuclear weapons.

In the present complex and explosive situation NATO's large-scale "games" can only be viewed as playing with fire. The USSR is attentively watching the Pentagon and NATO military activity near Soviet borders and is taking appropriate measures to ensure its own and its allies' security.

CSO: 1801/25

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

TASS HIGHLIGHTS UK 'BRAVE DEFENDER' MANEUVERS

LD062339 Moscow TASS in English 2133 GMT 6 Sep 85

[Text] London September 6 TASS--TASS correspondent Sergey Terekhov reports:

The maneuvers code-named "Brave Defender," the largest in Britain's entire post-war history, start in that country today. They will cover virtually the entire territory of the United Kingdom, which, according to the scenario worked out in defense ministry, will be divided into respective "combat operations zones." It is intended to involve in the war games a total of about 65,000 servicemen, reservists and "volunteers" from among civilians who were earlier in active duty service.

Despite the assurances of the British command that the "Brave Defender" maneuvers are of purely national and non-nuclear character, an active role in them is assigned to the U.S. troops stationed at military bases throughout Britain. It is known that nuclear weapons are deployed at many of them. The British military establishment has contemplated that U.S. officers would be directly involved in guiding the maneuvers from command posts.

The NEW STATESMAN weekly made exposures on the eve of the start of the "Brave Defender" exercises. It reported that it was planned to practice a number of "crisis situations" during the maneuvers, under which the government would be vested with "emergency powers" authorizing it to disregard the British Parliament. The transfer of a whole number of the country's regions under the U.S. command can become one of the consequences of such "situations."

The scenario of the maneuvers, which were in preparation for almost two years, was from the outset of the anti-Soviet character. According to the information that leaked into the press, under the "imaginary enemy" the organizers of the maneuvers specifically imply units of the Soviet Army which allegedly launch a "sudden attack on the country's key defense facilities." "Details" of this kind leave no doubt that certain circles in Britain's top hierarchy take strong interest in stoking a new campaign of militarist hysteria with an obvious anti-Soviet undertone. Drawing attention to the provocative character of the maneuvers, D. Davis, a member of the shadow cabinet of the Labour Party, in charge of the questions of defense and armaments, sharply criticized the conservative government that has refused to discuss in Parliament the question of the dangerous military games.

CSO: 1812/11

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

U.S. ACCUSED OF AIDING PAKISTAN TO DESTABILIZE REGION

[Editorial Report] Tashkent OZBEKISTON ADABIYOTI VA SAN'ATI in Uzbek 28 June 1985 carries on page 7 a 700-word commentary by Tursun Qoratoyev entitled "The Delusions of Ziaul Haq" in which he asserts that the United States is supporting Pakistani actions that threaten peace and stability in South and Southwest Asia. Recently the world press carried reports that Pakistan is intensifying its efforts to build a nuclear weapon. Western-trained specialists are working on the project, which is financed by Saudi Arabia. Instead of blocking the attempt the United States delivers to Pakistan F-16 fighter bombers which can carry this weapon. Naturally, Pakistan's efforts seriously alarm its neighbors, especially India. These concerns are not unfounded. Pakistan's aggressive actions have led to three wars between the two states in the last 37 years. In an October 1984 issue of the Pakistani newspaper JANG it was written that the third world war would arise out of a conflict between Pakistan and India. For a long time the United States has been seeking to extend its influence over India's foreign and domestic policies, first, by supporting reactionary forces within the country, and second, by arming Pakistan and creating dangerous gensions. One of America's foremost Asian specialists Selig Harrison said in a congressional speech that if India were to meet certain preconditions Washington would reevaluate its policy toward Pakistan. These conditions include recognizing the legality of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean, satisfying the Pentagon's desire to turn Diego Garcia into a military support base, and repealing its ban on foreign military bases on its territory. Obviously, India could not accept this. In addition to arming Pakistan, the U.S. administration is delivering arms to Afghan counterrevolutionaries camped in Pakistan.

CSO: 1801/410

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIEF

'CORAL SEA-85' EXERCISE--The largest maneuvers of the U.S. and Australian Armed Forces to be held in recent years--"Coral-Sea-85"--are under way in the east coast region of Australia and the adjacent waters. They are being held in place of the previously planned maneuvers of the three member countries of the ANZUS military bloc--the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Military cooperation between the United States and New Zealand practically ceased after the country's Labor Government banned ships carrying nuclear weapons or powered with nuclear engines from entering the ports.
[Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 13 Oct 85 LD]

CSO: 1801/25

AFGHANISTAN

ARMY PAPER PRAISES COURAGE OF HELICOPTER CREWS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Major A. Oliynik, special correspondent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA; "The Hot Sky: About the Courage and Skill of the Soviet Helicopter Pilots in Afghanistan"]

[Text] It was already the Mi-8 helicopter's fourth trip to the high landing pad. Actually, it was not really a landing pad, but a tiny clearing on the side of a mountain ridge hidden in the valley of Five Lions called Pandzhsher.

"Over 4500 meters," noted helicopter commander Capt N. Pyrin to himself after looking at the altimeter. "I have never had to land at this altitude at night." He started to slowly twist the control stick. The sheer cliffs appeared to rear up on their hind legs and rush to meet the rotary-wing aircraft. It seemed that only at the last moment the main rotor blades avoided striking the cliffs overhanging the clearing." But the helicopter flew a circular glide path precisely to the pulsating fire of the smoke pot.

Capt Pyrin knew how anxiously those below him were observing him now. "Thank you, we could wait no longer..." The headsets rumbled with the broken, familiar voice of the airborne subunit commander, Capt D. Lyutyy, with whom the helicopter crews had often worked. The experienced commander, holder of the Order of the Red Star, Capt Lyutyy called on the helicopters at the most difficult times. Now was just such a moment for the airborne soldiers: it was necessary to immediately evacuate wounded sappers. However, this turned out to be almost impossible: the mountains were enshrouded with a starless night. But the men had to be saved. And then the commander called for Capt Pyrin...

The helicopter couldn't land but came close to the clearing and one wheel hung in the air over the precipice. Capt Pyrin held the aircraft steady while the wounded soldiers were put in the cargo compartment.

"Loaded, I'm taking off!" He reported over the radio to the air traffic control tower.

But, when it moved away from the rocks, the overloaded helicopter did not begin to rise but slowly sank into the precipice. The Mi-8 fell about 300

meters. At the proper altitude Pyrin changed the angle on the blades and the aircraft leveled out smoothly. He alone knew how precisely he had to handle the control stick and throttle in this situation...

Capt Nikolay Pyrin is 32 years old. He is not only known in the squadron for his mustache and greying temples which are especially noticeable against a background of hair which is almost as black as tar. His main attribute is his great flying experience. "Master of night landings" his comrades call him with respect. A graduate of the Saratov Higher Military Aviation Academy for Pilots, Capt Pyrin is in the Afghan land for the second time. In 1983, he flew over the vast sand dunes of the Registan Desert, and now his flight path takes him mainly over the ridges of the Hindu Kush. He has flown more than 800 hours. For courage and heroism displayed during the accomplishment of his international duty, he has been awarded the Red Star Order and the Komsomol Central Committee "Military Valor" Badge.

...Our conversation took place in an officers' module, a prefab building sheltered at the edge of the airfield. Also in the air-conditioned room were the crew members: navigator, Sr Lt V. Ovchinnikov, and crew chief, Sr Lt S. Usimov. His friends came to congratulate the commander on his 342nd parachute jump which Capt Pyrin made while we were present.

"What is the most difficult thing in the work of a helicopter pilot?" I asked Nikolay Viktorovich when the conversation turned to combat operations.

"To inculcate composure in a pilot..."

"Flying well is only half the battle," Pyrin continued quietly as if thinking aloud. "We must meet such situations as if penetrating mountain jungles where no instructions provide the answer for what to do. Most dangerous for a helicopter pilot is flinching or being startled, losing self-control if only for a few seconds..."

The conversation moved from service to home, dear to the heart of every land. Drawings by children and several photographs were neatly posted on the wall over Pyrin's bed. In the center was a pretty woman and next to her were photographs of children with their father's eyes.

"My family corner," Pyrin smiles, "My wife, Olga, and daughters Yuliya and Mashen'ka. My wife writes letters and the girls draw..."

I have seen many such "family corners" in Afghanistan! They are put up in sleeping quarters, in tents, in vehicle cabs... They now pass before my eyes, these pictures of women and children. Mothers, wives, loved ones... How dear they all are whose fate cuts them off from their homes and how they help them to bear the harsh service life...

The helicopter flyers have short breathers. This hot Sunday was an exception. Soon Capt Pyrin was urgently summoned to headquarters: he was faced with another flight with a paratrooper on board.

Soon our Mi-8 was on course to the Kunar Valley border region. We entered the zone controlled by the Dushmans. The helicopter began to quickly change speed and altitude and hugged the cliffs. Pyrin, who was sitting so relaxed minutes before, drew himself upright; the muscles in his tanned neck strained, and his hand gripped the control stick tightly. The open face of the navigator, Sr Lt Ovchinnikov, became grim. The hands of the crew chief's, Sr Lt Usimov, grew stiff on the machine gun handles; at any moment a dushman burst could strike from behind the cliffs.

Helicopter mountain operations are difficult and dangerous, especially in the gorges of the Kunar Valley.

In order to understand the extent of their courage and the risks, one must see this majestic, gothic mountain architecture where, when striking against the sheer cliffs, the impetuous "Afghans" capriciously change direction, blowing up whirlwinds and flowing in descending currents into deep narrow valleys and canyons. It is necessary to analyze the sharp temperature changes and dropping pressure, instantaneously make the naturally correct decision and sometimes take risks. In short, here each flight is a trial of flying skill, composure and courage.

"Arrived at designated location; landing," I heard Pyrin report.

After a sharp turn, our Mi-8 came precisely on course without any "adjustment." The wingman, Capt Aleksandr Tsyplukhin, holder of the Order of the Red Star, behind us made the turn. From the air, a pair of Mi-24's commanded by Maj V. Chumakov covered the combat assault with a gun run.

Hurtling below us rush boulders, small camel-thorn bushes and clouds of dust... The doors are thrown open wide; alarms sound: "Out!"

Bunching up, the assault troops led by Capt R. Abzalimov leaped down on to the rocks...

Having landed the assault, the Mi-8 takes off into the blue sky. I observed the unhurried movements of Pyrin. He did not rush to leave the landing zone. He made a circle, listened to reports by the assault commander and his wingman. The lines of the lean face now grow sharper and wrinkles are more pronounced--he is tired.

In Afghanistan, much "hangs" on helicopters--combat and transport. But, perhaps, the greatest load is on the ubiquitous Mi-8.

"Our 'Swallow' is a very modern aircraft," Pyrin says. "It is as if it had been born for the mountains. Not long ago, for example, we had to deliver ammunition and rations to a post located on one of the commanding heights of the Safed-Koch range. The altitude was more than 4000 meters. The trails were mined. Of course, only helicopters could reach it. And they did reach it.

True, in order to take as much cargo onboard as possible in this situation, they had to remove the helicopter doors and the protective gear. But Pyrin was silent about this.

Capt N. Pyrin and his combat comrades, Communists Lt Col N. Korostelkin, Major's V. Zverev and A. Sokolov and Capt A. Zaplitnyy, could tell many things about flying in mountains... How they made it through the clouds and the Dushman block to the high mountain Parandekh ravine where sappers clearing mines from mountain paths had been hurt in an explosion. How they pulled lost shepherds from a local collective out of the red-hot Registan Desert "oven." How they saved people during an "Afghan" which raged for several days... At the most difficult moments, when the Dushmans sometimes attempt to block our and Afghan subunits and food, fuel, medical supplies and water are needed immediately, the "Swallows" with Red Stars come from the sky with help.

You could go on as long as you want naming others of whom to sing the glory to the daily heroism of the pilots and our reliable helicopter! Everyday in the Afghan land people and aircraft pass the most difficult of all tests--fire. The courage and skill of the helicopter pilots are examples of the highest combat example.

Passing this test is not simple. By day the faces of the crew become blackened from the burning sun and wind, and by evening the short jackets harden from the salt remaining after their sweat dries. But the main danger is Dushman fire on the rotary-wing aircraft. The counterrevolutionaries, receiving support from foreign sponsors headed by the U.S., go out of their way to make air communications in the country difficult. These communications are made possible by Soviet aviators along with the Afghan pilots. But attempts by the rebels are in vain. They are not being allowed to interrupt the air communications.

And they will not be allowed to! In the hot Afghan sky, the helicopters and airplanes with the Red Star are piloted by real live aces. One of them is military pilot 1st Class, Capt N. Pyrin, an internationalist with the burning heart of a Communist, faithfully accomplishing his patriotic duty.

Maybe today, as these lines are being read, the "Sparrow" with the Red Star, commanded by Capt Pyrin, hiding in the terrain, is flying over the Hindu-Kush spurs, hurrying to save our soldiers: ground subunits of the Limited Group of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan are always under reliable cover from the air.

12747
CSO: 1801/298

AFGHANISTAN

HELICOPTER EXPLOITS IN DRA DESCRIBED

PM161141 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Oct 85 First Edition p 6

[Article by special correspondent Colonel I. Tarantenko, reportage under the rubric "From An Afghan Notebook": "Difficult Skies"]

[Text] Kabul-Moscow--I walked over the burning hot runway covered with sheets of corrugated iron toward a small white two-story building with a glass tower which stood on the edge of the airfield. Beside it there were staff cars, and a little way ahead stood white, trapezoid living modules. Helicopters were pressed to the ground with their blades lowered, as though trying to escape from the heat. Beside them were pilots and technicians in pale blue coveralls faded by the sun. Flight preparations were in progress. Through an open window I could hear the meteorologist being asked time and again from the flight control tower: "Report temperature!"

The replies were depressingly similar: "Plus 49.5."

In a room on the ground floor, to the monotonous drone of a refrigerator and an air conditioner, we were compelled to while away the time with Lieutenant Colonel V. Tselovalnik--we drank tea brewed in the Pashtun manner, which is said to quench thirst better than ice-cold spring water. Viktor Petrovich spoke about the special features of helicopter service under Afghan conditions:

"The helicopter is as essential here now as the indispensable donkey, which has served the Afghan well for many centuries," he said. "Perhaps even more essential. Our brother has work enough to do. Ammunition, food, fuel, fertilizers, mail--all that is needed to live and struggle is now delivered by helicopter to the almost inaccessible mountain regions of Afghanistan. And helicopter pilots also have to evacuate those injured in fighting the dushmans, frequently under fire. This is the kind of work..."

Before my trip to Afghanistan I learned that the title of Hero of the Soviet Union had been conferred on Lieutenant Colonel V. Ochirov for courage and heroism, displayed while fulfilling his international duty in the DRA. Valeriy Nikolayevich had served here. People remember him and are proud of him, and his combat flights have become legendary.

I was told how (Mir-Abdullo), secretary of the PDPA committee, came to the airfield one day and made a moving plea for help. It turned out that a dushman gang had attacked the settlement of (Kara-Bagi). The party cell and the self-defense detachment had joined the combat, but the forces were unequal. The defenders of the revolution fought staunchly, but the fight lasted several hours--ammunition was running out, and there were wounded people in need of urgent medical assistance. Under those conditions no one but Soviet helicopter pilots could give them assistance. A group of helicopters under V. Ochirov's command soon took off into the evening sky.

From the air, Valeriy Nikolayevich quickly found the settlement from the flashes of gunfire. The dushmans began to machinegun the helicopters from a long way off. Our pilots were forced to respond to their challenge. Free-flight rockets fired from the helicopters struck home, and the dushman positions were covered with gushing explosions. During this time other helicopters were able to land freight for the Afghan comrades and take wounded people on board.

Drawing fire.... How many times, hastening to help out friends, has Lt Col V. Ochirov's helicopter been a target for machine guns? What bullets and shells have been fired at it: American, Israeli, Pakistani...? Valeriy Ochirov has made hundreds of flights in Afghanistan's skies--very difficult flights, demanding the utmost mental and physical effort.

In a recent fight he had to operate in the same crew as Afghan pilots. That time a dushman gang attacked a food convoy near the settlement of Zareh Sharan. On approaching the village, they saw drifts of black smoke--knocked-out trucks were burning on the road. Suddenly an emplacement of heavy machineguns began firing at the helicopter from the slope of the nearest mountain. The commander led the helicopter into the attack. An attack--in the face of heavy fire--lasts a few seconds. But those seconds decide who will prevail: Either you defeat the enemy, or...

Ochirov neutralized that source of fire, but on coming out of the attack he noticed new lead tracers streaming toward them from the ground. And once again the obedient machine descended to the very base of the fiery trace. This was repeated several times. They flew off only after an Afghan battalion had been flown in. V. Ochirov was told: "Ground control is pleased with your work!"

No, such flights do not always have a happy ending. How hard it is to lose combat friends! On one occasion an Afghan subunit was in difficulty high in the mountains: Their way was barred from the south by the well-defended border with Pakistan, from the west by sharp-pointed ridges, from the north by a precipitous ravine hardly accessible even to mountaineers, and from the east by approaching superior dushman forces. Help could come only from the sky. And it did come. Despite strong fire resistance, the helicopter's crew--squadron Deputy Commander Major A. Malyshev, Captain V. Isakov, and Senior Lieutenant S. Tkachenko--succeeded in landing the machine on a tiny spot. True, the helicopter sustained serious damage on landing, and the starboard engine caught fire. However, ammunition, food, and water were delivered at

a most critical moment. They put out the fire and fixed the damage, but on takeoff the helicopter came under direct fire from a heavy machinegun and blew up.

Life on the airfield was proceeding as normal--according to strict army routine. Once the day's heat had "crossed the equator", the flights started up again. And those who had to remain at the airfield anxiously awaited the crews' return. We waited for our sortie. It was a routine flight, so Lt Col V. Tselovalnik said. Not much remains in my memory--the feeling of riding at a furious pace in a racing car (this is when the helicopter flies at a height of 2-3 meters above the road). Then cliffs swept past the cabin windows on three sides--we were flying through ravines. Gray slopes seemed to rear up right by the blades and suddenly topple over on their side. The machine made a turn at some incredible angle and once again descended into a ravine, as from a steep mountain. It is quite likely that under peaceful conditions pilots are "put in the guardhouse" for flying this way. But here such flights are a grim necessity.

Viktor Petrovich Tselovalnik, who has done a lot of flying over a long time, described the basic rules for flying helicopters under Afghan conditions:

"The chief point is not to get nervous. Control the machine smoothly and calmly. Turbulence in the ravines is a normal phenomenon; descending and ascending currents can hit the machine at any moment--you cannot be unaware, you must always be ready for this. Be ready at every second to land the machine on any area--sloping or on the edge of a precipice. Here you have to work very accurately. However, as you know, the rules do not cover every eventuality. Experience is gained on every flight--little by little."

Toward evening we received an alarming report: A dushman gang had again attacked a peaceful village, and there was an urgent need to land a subunit of Afghan soldiers there. (Akiramad), the representative of the people's power who delivered that piece of news, was also flying with us. He seemed calm, but it was an outward calm. The blades whipped up the sand, the yellowed grass at the edge of the runway was flattened onto the stones, at last the MI-8 took off, and (Akiramad) at once took up his post by the open window. Quite a short while later we suddenly saw a column of smoke rising from a mountain top on our left, and further on a second and a third column. A whole chain of smoke columns. Hardly a simple coincidence.

"The dushmans are signaling," (Akiramad) said excitedly. "We must be quick, be quick..."

The commander gained height, executed a maneuver on the sun side against antiaircraft defense, and explained: "The sun makes a more attractive target for the heat-seeking warhead of an antiaircraft missile." And the dushmans have begun using such missiles quite often, although the efficiency of these formidable weapons is not so high here, in Afghanistan's hot skies.

Navigator Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Guskov warned: "We will soon be at the target. And the helicopter flew over a village, circled around, and resumed

its set course. The ground now seemed still closer. Everything was clearly visible--hens and goats running for cover, while short flashes, as though arc welders were working there, could be seen behind adobe walls in the ruins. It turned out that it was submachineguns and machineguns "working". A battle was taking place beneath us. (Akiramad) also fired a light machinegun in some direction through the open door. I do not know how he determined where his own men were, and where the dushman were--there is no front line as such here. His teeth were tightly clenched, and knots of muscle moved over his cheekbones. The helicopter descended and searched for landing signals.

"Commander!"--flight technician Senior Lieutenant Nikolay Marchenko shouted, "A heavy machine gun is firing at us..."

"Cool it, Kolya! Return fire..."

We landed in a field. Overripe wheat was burning behind an adobe wall. Red tracer bullets were leaving their track noiselessly and somehow quite peacefully over the yellow buildings and trees. Of course, we could not hear the shots and bursts of fire. A strange sensation: I could not believe that somewhere close by a fight was being fought to the death.

We returned to the airfield in the evening. Helicopters were resting like tired birds at the edge of the airfield. Private Boris Yevstigneyev was watering the flowers by the staff building. Only the next day the sunflowers caught your eye, amicably turning their golden heads to the sun.

"They are yours, from the Ukraine," Lt Col V. Tselovalnik said. "Soldiers brought the seeds..."

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CSO: 1801/35

AFGHANISTAN

SAPPER ACTIVITIES IN DRA DESCRIBED

LD181817 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 18 Oct 85

[From the "Vremya" newscast; M. Leshchinskiy video report]

[Text] [Leshchinskiy seen beside an arch of triumph, partly in ruin] Every Afghan knows this monument--this triumphal arch--knows and respects it. It was erected in the center of the little town of Paghman and is dedicated to the glorious victory of the Afghan people over the British colonialists. But you can see what state the monument is in now. It was struck literally yesterday by a dushman mine. Thus do these hired murderers wage war not only against their own people, but also against its glorious history and its ancient traditions. [shots of ruined buildings, group of soldiers going into courtyards and doorways]

The dushmans not only destroy entire villages and drive the population away from them, but they also leave their caches of weapons under the ruins in the futile hope of returning; they also mine the approaches and peasant fields. In order to film this reportage, the fighters of the People's Militia and I had to pass through these mined fields for quite a distance. But everyone was calm. For in front were the Soviet sappers, led by Captain Fomenko, who not only made passages through the mines, but also discovered quite a few bandit caches like this one. [group of men shown unwinding rags from rifles lying amid rubble; at least 12 Soviet and Afghan soldiers in background]

[Leshchinskiy] Comrade captain, the first question to you: What sort of weapons have you found here in this village?

[Fomenko] Mainly British-made and American-made weapons.

[Leshchinskiy] What sort of weapons are they--small arms, mines?

[Fomenko] Small arms ammunition of British manufacture, and small arms; Chinese recoilless weapons, together with shells for them.

[Leshchinskiy turns to Afghan] Captain Fomenko's story is continued by People's Militia soldier Mumin, who says that the Soviet sappers are helping them discover and render harmless all this foreign weaponry. These are our real friends-in-arms and senior instructors.

[video shows group of Soviet and Afghan soldiers lining up for photograph next to piles of ammunition, rifles stacked up against a pile of logs]
[Leshchinskiy] And now for a photograph as a momento--a momento not only of friendship, but also of the battles and dangers which they experienced together in the fight for the future of the Afghan land.

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AFGHANISTAN

DUSHMAN INTERFERENCE IN DRA ELECTRICAL SUPPLY NOTED

LD070401 [Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 6 October carries a 34-minute "International Panorama" program. Broadcast within this program is a 6-minute video report by Mikhail Leshchinskiy from Afghanistan.

Leshchinskiy conducts an interview in the village of Sahebzadagan on the introduction of electricity there. An unidentified village inhabitant is interviewed and says that the village had always dreamt of electrical light, but that Afghanistan's previous rulers were not concerned with the needs of ordinary people. The villager then expresses thanks to the state and the revolution which provided the electricity, and which will aid the development of the peasants' cooperative that has been set up.

Leshchinskiy notes that the transformer station in the village draws power from a power line stretching to Kabul from the Naghlu hydro power station. He notes that the power line is nearly 80 km and has 420 pylons, each weighing 15 metric tons. Leshchinskiy then says: "A hired bandit from the Hasan Hang gang blew up one-third of the pylons last year which had been erected in the most difficult areas. Kabul was left without electricity as a result. The bandits, who escaped to Pakistan, boasted in front of BBC microphones that he had not only blown up the pylons, but also had mined all roads and approaches to them, so that it would be impossible to restore the line. But people went to work on the dushman mines, climbed the steep mountain slopes, and re-erected the pylons by hand. The line was restored within one-and-a-half months, and, each meter of it is currently under the reliable guard of the people's militia. It needs to be stated that the dushman mines and shells not only explode where the pylons are, but also here, at the hydropower station" [video shows a winding road with pylons in its vicinity wreckage of pylons, and soldiers guarding the power line].

A worker at the Naghlu GES, Mohammad Rostam, is interviewed. He is on crutches, recently injured during a dushman shelling of the GES building, and in particular, of a distribution substation. Leshchinskiy then reports from the Naghlu GES. This relatively small GES will be 20 years old next year. Its turbines are turned by the waters of the Panjsher and Kabul rivers. Video shows festive meeting at GES, devoted to generation of fourth billion bilowatt hour.

An interview is then conducted with the DRA's electrical energy minister, Paktin, who says that only 5 percent of Afghanistan's hydro power engineering resources are being used thus far. He notes that another power station will be constructed near here, which will be more powerful than all stations currently in operation. The Afghan minister adds that great hopes are placed, with regard to the station's construction, on cooperation with the USSR. Video shows reservoir of GES near dam.

Leshchinskiy ends by noting that an exhibition has opened in Kabul showing Soviet land reclamation and water conservancy video shows shots from the exhibition.

CSO: 1801/25

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEF

UN PUBLISHES DRA LETTER--New York October 1 TASS--The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan condemned the continuing aggressive actions by the Pakistani Armed Forces and demanded their immediate termination. This is said in a letter addressed to the United Nations secretary general by the permanent representative of the D.R.A. to the United Nations. The letter was published here as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The letter says that on September 22 and 24 the Pakistani Armed Forces staged new acts of aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, bringing heavy fire on Barikot and Shamshad settlements. As a result of these attacks a number of people were killed and wounded, and extensive material damage was caused. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1803 GMT 1 Oct 85 LD]

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